U.S. v. Georgia, et al. / Goodman, Tony v. Georgia, et al. (01/10/2006)

Questions presented: (1) Whether, and to what extent, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12131 et seq., validly abrogates state sovereign immunity for suits by prisoners with disabilities challenging discrimination by state-operated prisons? (2) Whether Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12131 to 12165, is a proper exercise of Congress's power under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment, as applied to the administration of prison systems?

BY CARMEN JONES, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE

There are 2.2 million Americans who require the use of wheelchairs, including Tony Goodman, whose multiple spinal fractures and subsequent paralysis were the result of a 1992 auto accident, according to a 1997 U.S. Census Bureau report.

On July 1, 1995, Goodman was arrested after he "shot at his girlfriend and then removed himself from the wheelchair and beat her," according to a court filing. Goodman was convicted of aggravated assault, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Goodman's lengthy 30-year sentence placed him as one of more than 47,000 inmates in the Georgia prison system.

In June 1996, Goodman was transferred to Georgia State Prison, a maximum-security facility in Reidsville. According to records, Goodman was placed in the special management unit named the K-Building "both because of his continuous disruptive conduct and the special requirements associated with his being wheelchair bound." While in Reidsville, Goodman claimed that he was confined in his K-1 unit cell – which measured twelve-feet long by three-feet wide – for twenty-three to twenty-four hours each day.

In addition, Goodman claimed that from April 1998 through May 1999, he lived in sub-standard conditions and was denied basic rights as a prisoner. Among Goodman's most disturbing claims was being "forced to ride handcuffed and shackled in the back of a van without seatbelts or restraints," after which he "fell to the floor and lost consciousness several times." Goodman also claimed that he had to "hurl" himself from his wheelchair onto the toilet, an incident that led to an epileptic seizure, a broken right toe and crushed knee. Goodman said that he was refused cleaning supplies by prison officials after he had a bowel movement and urinated on himself, leaving him "forced to live in a cell where the floor was smeared with defecation and urine."

Using Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Goodman filed a discrimination suit in 1999 against the state of Georgia, the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDOC), and eight prison officials. In his complaint, Goodman sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, including $600,000 from each individual defendant. Goodman claimed that prison officials "had knowledge and notice that [he] was not secured, safe or stabilized in this cell" and that "despite this knowledge of his precarious and perilous placement within the prison cell [they] proceeded to house him in a prison cell which was in total disregard of his health, safety and well-being."

Under Title II of the ADA, "a state shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this Act." Any state found in violation is required to remedy the offense.

A magistrate determined that Goodman's complaint did not "set forth a short, plain statement of the facts as to each defendant" and did not state "what specific constitutional violations occurred, the specific acts committed by each defendant that resulted in a particular constitutional violation, or on what date these alleged acts occurred." The magistrate also pointed out that the ADA applies to services, programs, and activities of "a public entity," leaving Georgia as the actual defendant in Goodman's ADA claims.

In August of 1999, the district court adopted the magistrate's recommendation and dismissed Goodman's claims against prison officials, but allowed the case against Georgia and the GDOC to stand. Goodman was not allowed to amend his claim.

Both Goodman and Georgia then filed cross motions for summary judgment, which were denied by the magistrate in February 2000 and by the district court a month later. The magistrate found that states were not immune to lawsuits brought under the ADA. After Goodman's initial suit, he transferred nine times to different correctional facilities before returning to Reidsville. Despite that, the magistrate ruled Goodman's claim for injunctive relief was still valid.

In June 2001, both sides agreed to trial by the magistrate. However, on Oct. 22, 2001, Georgia and the GDOC moved for summary judgment after the Supreme Court's decision in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett. In that opinion, the Court ruled that 14th Amendment claims of discrimination based on disability were not protected by Congress' powers to abrogate sovereign immunity under the 11th Amendment. Section 5 of the 14th Amendment, which allows Congress to make provisions as it relates to due process and equal protection, states: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." On Dec. 12, 2001, the magistrate approved Georgia and the GDOC's joint motion for summary judgment, finding Goodman's claims for monetary damages under the ADAwere prohibited by the 11th Amendment.

The U.S. Department of Justice, which enforces the ADA, intervened on Goodman's behalf, joined his suit against Georgia, and filed an appeal.

While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued yet another decision that impacted on Goodman's case. In Tennessee v. Lane, the Court held that in regard to the accessibility of judicial services, the ADA is legislation validly enacted pursuant to Congress's authority under the 14th Amendment and its abrogation of the states' 11th Amendment immunity is also valid. Following Lane, the parties and the 11th Circuit considered the application of Lane to the administration of prisons.

On Sept. 16, 2004, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on 11th Amendment grounds, applying its own recent precedent in Miller v. King, in which the 11th Circuit held that the ADA's provisions were not valid 14th Amendment legislation as applied to prisons. The court expressed concern that the ADA "substantively rewrites the 8th Amendment" because it may require states to allow "qualified, disabled prisoners" to "participate in a broad array of services, programs, and activities" already offered to non-disabled prisoners.

On the other hand, the court also ruled that Goodman's claims could continue against the prison officials in their individual, not official, and suggested that the claims that might implicate the 8th Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment ban would be those regarding his conditions of confinement and need for medical care.

"The panel did not offer any analysis for its conclusion, but merely relied on its opinion in Miller v. King," which found that Congress did not fully abrogate sovereign immunity as it relates to Title II enforcement in prisons, according to Justice Department's petition for rehearing. The rehearing petition was denied.

In his petition for review to the U.S. Supreme Court, Acting Solicitor General Paul Clement called the resolution of the case urgent because "delay is particularly inappropriate in the context of prison administration because, as this case illustrates, Title II's operation in that setting not infrequently redresses the inhumane, degrading, and health-endangering conditions of daily living for inmates."

The Solicitor General's office also noted that the 11th Circuit's opinion was "flatly inconsistent" with Tennessee v. Lane and in conflict with a 9th Circuit opinion in Phiffer v. Columbia River Correctional Institute, that was issued five days after the 11th Circuit's opinion.

On May 16, 2005, the Court accepted both cases – U.S. v. Georgia and Tony Goodman v. Georgia – and consolidated them for review.

On Jan. 10, 2006, as the Senate held confirmation hearings for Samuel Alito, the Court unanimously revived Goodman's suit against Georgia and its prison officials. Writing for the Court, Justice Antonin Scalia avoided some of the more nagging issues of federalism by holding that to the extent that the prison officials conduct violates both the ADA and the 8th and 14th amendments, then the ADA's provisions abrogating state sovereign immunity can stand.

"While the members of this Court have disagreed regarding the scope of Congress's 'prophylactic' enforcement powers under "5 of the Fourteenth Amendment...no one doubts that "5 grants Congress the power to 'enforce...the provisions' of the Amendment by creating private remedies against the States for actual violations of those provisions," wrote Scalia.

The Court did not reach the factual question of whether prison officials did violate the ADA or the 8th and 14th amendments.

Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg added a concurring opinion to note that in extending the ADA to prison inmates, Congress did not intend to limit its applicability only to cases involving 8th Amendment violations.

Attorneys in this case:Attorneys for Petitioner:PAUL D. CLEMENTActing Solicitor General, Counsel of RecordR. ALEXANDER ACOSTAAssistant Attorney GeneralPATRICIA A. MILLETTAssistant to the Solicitor GeneralDAVID K. FLYNNSARAH E. HARRINGTON