Abdur'rahman, Abu-Ali v. Bell (Warden)

Questions presented: (1) Did the 6th Circuit err in holding, in square conflict with decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and other circuits, that every Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion constitutes a prohibited "second or successive" habeas petition as a matter of law? (2) Does a court of appeals abuse its discretion in refusing to permit consideration of a vital intervening legal development when its failure to do so precludes a habeas petitioner from ever receiving any adjudication of his claims on the merits? (3) Did the 6th Circuit have jurisdiction to review the district courts order, dated November 27, 2001, transferring Abdur'rahman's Rule 60(b) motion to the 6th Circuit, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ?1631? (4) Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to review the 6th Circuits order, dated February 11, 2002, denying leave to file a second habeas corpus petition?

BY BRITTANY ABBATE, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE

On Feb. 16, 1986, James Lee Jones hatched a plan to rob Patrick Daniels, a small-time drug dealer living in Nashville, Tenn. He would provide a gun to an acquaintance, Harold Devalle Miller, who would surprise Daniels and Jones as Jones purchased marijuana in Daniels' apartment. Miller would then rob them both, and he and Jones would split the take later.

But the scheme didn't go as planned. Miller got scared, so Jones dropped the idea for the act -- but not the robbery.

The next day, Miller and Jones went to Daniels' apartment with a shotgun and an unloaded handgun. There, they forced Daniels and his girlfriend, Norma Norman, to the floor and used duct tape to restrain their hands and feet and cover their eyes and mouths.

Jones took a butcher knife from the kitchen and told Daniels he had been sent to "clean up." Jones was involved with a militant group called the Southeastern Gospel Ministry, and part of its stated mission was to remove drugs and drug dealers from the black community.

Jones stabbed Daniels six times in the chest, hitting him four times in the heart, while Daniels begged for his life. Jones watched Daniels' body spasm as he died, blood pouring from his nose and mouth. Then Jones turned to Norman, stabbing her several times. He left the knife in her back.

Jones and Miller also left with what they had come for; they took Daniels' ATM card, some marijuana and $300 in cash.

Jones, then 35, was arrested and charged with first degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder and armed robbery. Miller was also charged, but he pleaded guilty to second degree murder and armed robbery in exchange for testifying against Jones.

Jones' original attorney, Neal McAlpin, was hired by members of SEGM, the militant group with which Jones was involved. Because of the possible conflict of interest resulting from SEGM's influence over Jones at the time of the crime, McAlpin asked to withdraw as Jones' attorney.

Lionel Barrett and Sumpter Camp were last-minute replacements for McAlpin. Barrett and Camp neglected to meet with McAlpin or obtain his files during the transition, and although Barrett accepted the case in October 1986, the attorneys did not begin working on the case until March 1987. The trial was scheduled for July of that year in Davidson County Criminal Court.

SEGM also paid a portion of the new attorneys' fees. But the bill was not paid in full, and Barrett said he would not continue working on the case until he received the total amount. The attorneys had no money for investigative work to clear Jones and, as a result, no investigative work was done on Jones' behalf.

Had the attorneys looked into Jones' background, they would have uncovered a long history of violent criminal behavior, diagnosed anti-social personality disorders and brutal accounts of family abuse and dysfunction. Jones had been severely abused by his father. Both of Jones' siblings also had emotional problems and had attempted suicide. His sister bore hisfather's baby.

Jones was convicted in 1987 of first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder and armed robbery. He was sentenced to death on the murder charge and consecutive life sentences on the other charges.

The jury found three aggravating factors to warrant the death penalty. First, Jones had previously been convicted of a murder while in prison. Second, Daniels' murder was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel. And third, the murder was committed while Jones was involved in a robbery.

No mitigating factors were presented at the sentencing hearing. Only Jones and his wife testified in his defense, even though other members of his family were willing to, but never asked to appear. During the sentencing hearing, Jones admitted he killed Daniels.

Jones appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court on various grounds, including improper jury selection; insufficient evidence to support the robbery conviction (which contributed to the aggravating factors leading to his death sentence); insufficient evidence that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel; and failure of his lawyers and the trial court to consider Jones' mental fitness to receive the death penalty. The court denied all claims and affirmed his execution, scheduling it for June 10, 1990.

After the Tennessee Supreme Court declined to rehear his case, Jones - who converted to Islam in 1988 while in prison and changed his name to Abu-Ali Abdur'rahman -- filed an amended petition in the trial court claiming ineffective assistance of counsel during his original trial. An evidentiary hearing was held in May 1993, after which the trial judge agreed that Abdur'rahman's attorneys had been lacking, in part because they failed to present mitigating factors at sentencing.

Even so, the court did not overturn his conviction, ruling that the errors would not have changed the outcome of the case. The judge determined that the available mitigating factors, which may have persuaded jurors not to impose the death sentence, were also aggravating factors. The mitigating information included the fact that the murder Abdur'rahman committed in prison had been motivated out of a fear of homosexual advances, rather than it being drug- and gang-related, as the jurors were told.

The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the trial court's finding and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. A new execution date was set for June 10, 1996.

Abdur'rahman petitioned for a writ of federal habeas corpus to the U.S. District Court in Nashville, which granted a stay of execution on May 31, 1996. The court did so in response to a Supreme Court ruling issued the previous month, which required a district court to grant a stay while considering any federal habeas corpus petition that isn't obviously without merit. Otherwise, the prisoner might be executed while the court was considering the case, which would make the prisoner's habeas corpus claim moot.

Another evidentiary hearing was held on Feb. 6, 1998, during which Barrett and Camp admitted that their representation was inadequate and, in fact, may have contributed to Abdur'rahman's death sentence.

"I feel that my performance certainly did not satisfy the standards that I adhere to myself as far as pursuing the psychiatric aspect, particularly at the sentencing hearing," Barrett said during the hearing.

Camp testified that he and Barrett had failed Abdur'rahman.

"We didn't give the jury any reason to oppose death on James Jones (Abdur'rahman)," he said.

After the hearing, the district court threw out most of Abdur'rahman's claims because he had failed to first bring those claims before the Tennessee Supreme Court. Abdur'rahman could not go back to the state court at that point because the statute of limitations on his state appeals had expired.

However, because of new information presented at the evidentiary hearing about the way Barrett and Camp handled the original trial, the district court granted Abdur'rahman's habeas corpus appeal on his death sentence. U.S. District Judge Todd J. Campbell disagreed with the lower courts' ruling that the inadequate representation at trial had not affected the outcome of Abdur'rahman's case, particularly his sentence.

"Despite an abundance of mitigating evidence," Campbell wrote, "there was virtually a complete failure by counsel to present a defense to the jury at [Abdur'rahman's] sentencing."

In response to Campbell's ruling, both sides appealed. Abdur'rahman still wanted his conviction overturned, and the state, through Riverbend Maximum Security Institution Warden Ricky Bell, wanted Abdur'rahman's death sentence reinstated.

In a 2-1 decision, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Campbell's ruling that vacated Abdur'rahman's death sentence. It also upheld Campbell's decision denying Abdur'rahman's appeal of his conviction. The 6th Circuit, which based its decisions on the same reasoning as the original trial court, essentially killed both of Abdur'rahman,s habeas corpus petitions.

Abdur'rahman petitioned the federal appeals court for a rehearing, which was denied. He appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which denied certiorari Oct. 9, 2001. A subsequent request for rehearing was denied two months later. Based on the high court's response, Abdur'rahman had exhausted all recourse, and a new execution date would be set.

In the meantime, the Tennessee Supreme Court had issued a new rule. "Rule 39" states that claims made in a federal habeas corpus petition were not required to be exhausted in the state system before going to federal court. That meant that the reason Judge Campbell denied many of Abdur'rahman's claims was no longer valid.

Abdur'rahman's attorneys re-petitioned the U.S. District Court, but both the district court and the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that doing so would constitute a second consideration of a habeas corpus petition, which is prohibited.

On April 8, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court stayed Abdur'rahman's execution, pending a decision on whether to review the case, and two weeks later, on April 22, the Court granted certiorari in the case, limiting review to questions 1 and 2 in Abdur'rahman's petitiion, and allowed him to proceed in forma pauperis.

Bradley MacLean, one of Abdur'rahman's attorneys, said the question before the Supreme Court is more about a technicality of the law than about the case itself.

"[It] is fairly narrow . . . and I am extremely optimistic that we will win on that issue," he said.

On Dec. 10, 2002, the Court dismissed the appeal. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented to the dismissal.