Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. etc. v. Stratton, Ohio, et al. (06/17/2002)

Questions presented: Does a municipal ordinance that requires one to obtain a permit prior to engaging in the door-to-door advocacy of a political cause and to display upon demand that permit, which contains the person's name, violate the 1st Amendment protection accorded to anonymous pamphleteering or discourse?

BY STEPHANIE KUENN, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE

Jehovahs Witnesses is a religious denomination with 6 million members worldwide, some of whom use door-to-door canvassing as a method to preach their message and introduce people to the church. Those church members who go door-to-door have found canvassing a difficult path to walk in Stratton, Ohio.

Stratton, a small town in eastern Ohio with a population of about 300, passed an ordinance in 1998 to regulate door-to-door canvassing and solicitation of private homes in the village. Those interested in going door-to-door to "sell, advertise, promote or explain any product, service, organization or cause" were required to register with the mayors office.

The registration form required individuals to explain their cause and why they were canvassing, as well as list all residences they intended to call upon. Registration entailed no fee. Once registered, individuals would receive a permit from the Mayor and could canvass any private residence in Stratton between the hours of 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., except for owners who filed No Solicitation Forms with the city, or homes with a "No Solicitation" sign on the property.

The No Solicitation Form listed a number of organizations that a resident could keep from coming to his or her home by placing a check mark next to their name. The only religious organization on this list was Jehovahs Witnesses.

If individuals did not follow the rules of the ordinance, they could be charged with a fourth-degree misdemeanor.

In June 1999, the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, on behalf of the Wellsville, Ohio Congregation of Jehovahs Witnesses, filed for an injunction against the ordinance in U.S. District Court for Southern Ohio. Lawyers for the society said the villages ordinance was unconstitutional and infringed upon the groups 1st Amendment rights. The village maintained the ordinance was content neutral and put in place to prevent fraud and protect its citizens rights to privacy.

The district court rejected most of the societys claims in August 1999, but held that three of the provisions violated the Constitution: the 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. time constraint, the section of the No Solicitation reform that listed Jehovahs Witnesses and the requirement that registrants list each residence they intend to visit. Stratton officials agreed to modify these three provisions. The district court also ordered the village to pay the societys legal fees, saying the society prevailed on three issues and thus, was entitled. rmined that plaintiffs were a prevailing party and therefore entitled to attorneys' fees. The total in attorneys fees and costs amounted to $58,892.41.

Both sides appealed, and on Feb. 20, 2001, a 6th Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed 2-1 the district courts judgment.

In finding that the ordinance did not violate against the societys 1st Amendment rights, the majority found that the ordinance was content neutral and that Stratton did not "apply the ordinance unequally," wrote Justice Cornelia Kennedy.

Paul Polidoro, a lawyer for the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, argued the ordinance was unconstitutionally overbroad and prevented Jehovahs Witnesses members from engaging in political and/or religious speech.

"In this ordinance, the right of an individual to engage in anonymous speech is gone," he said. "They have to go to the mayor or have a permit in their hands" to go door-to-door.

Abraham Cantor, an attorney who represents the Village of Stratton in this case, disagreed.

"It's not overbroad," he said. "By the nature of the conduct, it is not anonymous."

The majority agreed with the towns position, stating that individuals who go "door-to-door to engage in political speech are not anonymous by virtue of the fact that they reveal a portion of their identities - their physical identities - to the residents they canvass."

The society also contended the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, meaning a normal person would not understand what the ordinance meant, specifically the definition of the word "cause." The court rejected this claim.

In his dissent, though Justice Ronald Gilman agreed that the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague and did not violate the free exercise rights of the Jehovah's Witnesses, he argued that the ordinance violated 1st Amendment speech rights "by burdening substantially more speech than is necessary to further the Villages legitimate interests."

Gilman noted that by subjecting noncommercial solicitation to its permit requirements in the name of preventing fraud, the ordinance burdened "not only those wishing to engage in sales transactions -- a possible avenue for fraud -- but also those wishing to engage in political, religious, or social advocacy."

On Oct. 15, 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case, and limited review to the second question, cited above, in the Watchtower Bible's petition.

On June 17, 2002, the Court held 8-1 that Stratton's ordinance violates 1st Amendment's speech and religion rights.

Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the majority opinion, with Chief Justice Willliam Rehnquist being the lone dissenter.

In his opinion, he revisited the legal history of the Jehovah's Witnesses.

"The rhetoric used in the World War Two-era opinions that repeatedly saved (Jehovah's Witnesses) from petty prosecutions reflected the court's evaluation of the First Amendment freedoms that are implicated in this case," Stevens wrote. "The value judgement that then motivated a united democratic people to defend those very freedoms from totalitarian attack is unchanged. It motivates our decision today."

He concluded: "It is offensive that in the context of everyday public discourse a citizen must first inform the government of her desire to speak to her neighbors."

In Rehnquist's lone dissent, he criticized the ruling for rendering "local governments largely impotent to address the very real safety threat that canvassers pose," and cited a number of recent high profile stories in which citizens were victimized by people who went door-to-door to case neighborhoods or rip off the elderly.

"The Constitution does not require that Stratton first endure its own crime wave before it takes measures to prevent crime," he wrote.