Alvarez v. Smith
Justices will hear due process case on the taking of property (Feb. 23, 2009)
The Supreme Court has agreed to rule on the legal standard for a court hearing to test the forfeiture of property used in a drug crime
Six individuals whose property had been seized under Illinois’s Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (DAFPA), brought a class action lawsuit, arguing that DAFPA violated their constitutional right to due process. They said the act permitted them to be deprived of their personal property, including vehicles, without any hearing for too long.
DAFPA allows police departments 52 days following the seizure of property to decide whether to recommend forfeiture of the seized property. During those 52 days, it is the policy and practice of the City of Chicago and to refuse to return the seized property.
Following the City’s 52 allotted days, the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office have an additional 45 days to review the forfeiture recommendation of the Chicago Police Department. During those 45 days, it is policy and practice to refuse to return the seized property upon demand by the owner.
The plaintiffs in the case claimed that when property is seized under the Act, due process requires that they be given a prompt, postseizure, probable cause hearing, even though the DAFPA does not require any such hearing.
In the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, the plaintiffs conceded that based on the decision by the Seventh Circuit in Jones v. Takaki, their complaint should be dismissed. It was. But they asked the appeals court to reexamine Jones in light of two cases that predate Jones but were not cited in that opinion.
Last May, a three-judge panel on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit reversed and remanded the district court order.
On Feb. 23, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted the case for review. The justices will hear oral arguments in the fall.
Question presented: Whether local law enforcement agencies may seize and retain custody indefinitely of personal property without judicial or administrative review of the lawfulness of the continued detention of the property.
Court finds due process case on the taking of property moot (Dec. 8, 2009)
A case concerning the legal standard for a court hearing to test the forfeiture of property used in a drug crime became moot when the parties resolved the underlying disputes.
Six individuals whose property had been seized under Illinois’s Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (DAFPA), brought a class action lawsuit, arguing that DAFPA violated their constitutional right to due process. They said the act permitted them to be deprived of their personal property, including vehicles, without any hearing for too long.
DAFPA allows police departments 52 days following the seizure of property to decide whether to recommend forfeiture of the seized property. During those 52 days, it is the policy and practice of the City of Chicago and to refuse to return the seized property.
Following the City's 52 allotted days, the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office have an additional 45 days to review the forfeiture recommendation of the Chicago Police Department. During those 45 days, it is policy and practice to refuse to return the seized property upon demand by the owner.
The plaintiffs in the case claimed that when property is seized under the Act, due process requires that they be given a prompt, postseizure, probable cause hearing, even though the DAFPA does not require any such hearing.
In the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, the plaintiffs conceded that based on the decision by the Seventh Circuit in Jones v. Takaki, their complaint should be dismissed. It was. But they asked the appeals court to reexamine Jones in light of two cases that predate Jones but were not cited in that opinion.
In May 2008, a three-judge panel on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit reversed and remanded the district court order.
On Dec. 8, 2009, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the appeals court decision. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the opinion of the court while Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
"At the time of oral argument, however, we learned that the underlying property disputes have all ended," Breyer wrote. "The State has returned all the cars that it seized, and the individual property owners have either forfeited any relevant cash or have accepted as final the State's return of some of it. We consequently find the case moot, and we therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to that court with instructions to dismiss."
For his part, Stevens noted that while "I agree that this case is moot and join Parts I and II of the court's opinion, I would not vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Following the teaching of our decision in U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, I would apply the general rule against vacating appellate judgments that have become moot because the parties settled."
Question presented: Whether local law enforcement agencies may seize and retain custody indefinitely of personal property without judicial or administrative review of the lawfulness of the continued detention of the property.