Virginia v. Moore

The Supreme Court will continue molding the contours of the exclusionary doctrine this Term, in a Virginia case challenging the use of evidence seized after officers arrested the defendant for a minor driving infraction that should only have resulted in a citation.

In the case, Virginia v. Moore, No. 06-1082, police stopped David Lee Moore after receiving a radio call alerting them that he was driving on a suspended license. Although state law specified that the procedure for punishing that infraction was issuance of a citation and summons to appear in court, the officers instead decided to arrest Moore.

After reading Moore his Miranda rights, they asked for and received consent to search his hotel room. Once they arrived at the room, they decided to search his person and discovered sixteen grams of crack cocaine. Moore was then charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

Moore's attorney asked the trial court to suppress the cocaine evidence, arguing that it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court allowed the evidence to be presented and Moore was convicted.

A series of appeals culminated in a decision by the Virginia Supreme Court that the introduction of the cocaine evidence at trial was unconstitutional. The court reasoned that the United States Supreme Court's 1998 opinion in Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998) compelled its rejection of the evidence.

In Knowles, the Court held that police had no authority to search the car of a man who was stopped for a traffic infraction punishable only by citation. Attorneys representing Virginia asked the Court to hold that Knowles does not apply when officers actually arrest a suspect, as those situations are more likely to involve danger to officers or the need to preserve evidence for trial.

Attorneys for Moore, in resisting the petition for certiorari, have countered that the officers were subject to the Knowles limitation because the arrest they effected was unauthorized by state law, suggesting that the dangers alluded to by Virginia were illusory.

In addition to presenting the Court with another opportunity to refine the scope of the exclusionary doctrine, the case also raises potential federalism questions. The State has argued that officers and the public are best served by a single uniform standard regarding the constitutionality of searches. Officers should be required only to identify a probable cause for arrest in order to justify introduction of the evidence at trial, rather than having to demonstrate compliance with the interstices of fifty distinct sets of state law. (Notably, Virginia did not explain why the officers felt they had probable cause to arrest Moore rather than merely issue him a citation. In fact, Moore's attorneys contend that the officers "conceded that they had no reason to make an arrest rather than issue the summons required by law.")

Oral Argument: unscheduled

Fourth Amendment, search and seizure, evidence, exclusionary clause, search incident to arrest, federalism

The Supreme Court continued molding the contours of the exclusionary doctrine this Term, ruling that Virginia police acted constitutionally when they conducted a search following an arrest, even though the arrest may have violated a state law.

In the case, Virginia v. Moore, No. 06-1082, police stopped David Lee Moore after receiving a radio call alerting them that he was driving on a suspended license. Although state law specified that the procedure for punishing that infraction was issuance of a citation and summons to appear in court, the officers instead decided to arrest Moore.

After reading Moore his Miranda rights, they asked for and received consent to search his hotel room. Once they arrived at the room, they decided to search his person and discovered sixteen grams of crack cocaine. Moore was then charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

Moore's attorney asked the trial court to suppress the cocaine evidence, arguing that it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court allowed the evidence to be presented and Moore was convicted.

A series of appeals culminated in a decision by the Virginia Supreme Court that the introduction of the cocaine evidence at trial was unconstitutional. The court reasoned that the United States Supreme Court's 1998 opinion in Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998) compelled its rejection of the evidence.

In Knowles, the Court held that police had no authority to search the car of a man who was stopped for a traffic infraction punishable only by citation. Attorneys representing Virginia asked the Court to hold that Knowles does not apply when officers actually arrest a suspect, as those situations are more likely to involve danger to officers or the need to preserve evidence for trial.

Attorneys for Moore, in resisting the petition for certiorari, have countered that the officers were subject to the Knowles limitation because the arrest they effected was unauthorized by state law, suggesting that the dangers alluded to by Virginia were illusory.

In addition to presenting the Court with another opportunity to refine the scope of the exclusionary doctrine, the case also raises potential federalism questions. The State has argued that officers and the public are best served by a single uniform standard regarding the constitutionality of searches. Officers should be required only to identify a probable cause for arrest in order to justify introduction of the evidence at trial, rather than having to demonstrate compliance with the interstices of fifty distinct sets of state law. (Notably, Virginia did not explain why the officers felt they had probable cause to arrest Moore rather than merely issue him a citation. In fact, Moore's attorneys contend that the officers "conceded that they had no reason to make an arrest rather than issue the summons required by law.")

On April 23, a unanimous Supreme Court overturned the state supreme court decision.

"Warrantless arrests for crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the Constitution, and that while States are free to regulate such arrests however they desire, state restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment's protections," Justice Antonin Scalia wrote for the court.

In a concurring opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that although she supported the majority conclusion, she found "in the historical record more support for Moore’s position than the Court does."

Question presented:

May prosecutors introduce evidence seized during an arrest made in violation of state law?