U.S. v. Ressam

The Supreme Court is set to interpret a federal statute prohibiting the carrying of explosives during a felony in a case the government calls a linchpin of terrorism prosecutions.

The case, United States v. Ressam, No. 07-455, involves the so-called Millennium bomber. Ahmed Ressam is an Algerian citizen who was living in Canada when he decided to join al Qaeda. He traveled to Afghanistan to learn about making and using explosives, and eventually hatched a plot to bomb Los Angeles International Airport on New Year's Eve 1999.

Ressam and a conspirator loaded explosives and other bomb-making materials into a rental car and eventually crossed the United States border. He was asked to complete a customs declaration form and when he grew agitated, the border agent decided to inspect his car, and found the bomb.

Ressam was charged with several crimes, including carrying an explosive device during the commission of a felony, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(h)(2). The felony involved was lying to a customs agent.

Ressam was found guilty; he then opted to cooperate with the U.S. government but ultimately stopped providing information. The district court sentenced him to 22 years in prison, causing the government to appeal the sentence as unreasonably light. In response, Ressam appealed the conviction on the explosives count.

Ressam argued that the statute, which specifically forbids carrying explosives "during the commission of any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States," 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(h)(2), is not broken unless the bomb is carried "in relation to" the underlying felony. He concluded that because his bomb carrying was not linked to his lies to the customs agent, he had not violated the statute.

The Ninth Circuit agreed. It explained that although the statute does not include the words "in relation to," that condition may be read into the statute. Why? Because Congress had amended an analogous statute barring the use of a firearm during a felony to require that the gun be carried in relation to the underlying offense. Because the two statutes were designed to reach the same conduct, the explosives statute should include a relational requirement as well.

The government asked the Supreme Court to review the case, noting that the Third and Fifth Circuits had reached the opposite result. The government argued that consistent interpretation of the explosives statute was critical because the statute was crucial to terrorism prosecutions.

Ressam's lawyers unsuccessfully argued that the explosives count was just one of nine in the case, meaning that it would have little impact on Ressam's ultimate sentence and did not require correction. Moreover, they contended, the terrorism argument was a fig leaf, as the government could bring a battery of other charges for similar conduct and rarely used the provision at issue.

<--!begin subject-->explosives, terrorism, statutory interpretation, legislative history

The Supreme Court ruled in a high-profile case that the government has called a linchpin of terrorism prosecutions.

The case, United States v. Ressam, No. 07-455, involves the so-called Millennium bomber. Ahmed Ressam is an Algerian citizen who was living in Canada when he decided to join al Qaeda. He traveled to Afghanistan to learn about making and using explosives, and eventually hatched a plot to bomb Los Angeles International Airport on New Year's Eve 1999.

Ressam and a conspirator loaded explosives and other bomb-making materials into a rental car and eventually crossed the United States border. He was asked to complete a customs declaration form and when he grew agitated, the border agent decided to inspect his car, and found the bomb.

Ressam was charged with several crimes, including carrying an explosive device during the commission of a felony, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(h)(2). The felony involved was lying to a customs agent.

Ressam was found guilty; he then opted to cooperate with the U.S. government but ultimately stopped providing information. The district court sentenced him to 22 years in prison, causing the government to appeal the sentence as unreasonably light. In response, Ressam appealed the conviction on the explosives count.

Ressam argued that the statute, which specifically forbids carrying explosives "during the commission of any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States," 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(h)(2), is not broken unless the bomb is carried "in relation to" the underlying felony. He concluded that because his bomb carrying was not linked to his lies to the customs agent, he had not violated the statute.

The Ninth Circuit agreed. It explained that although the statute does not include the words "in relation to," that condition may be read into the statute. Why? Because Congress had amended an analogous statute barring the use of a firearm during a felony to require that the gun be carried in relation to the underlying offense. Because the two statutes were designed to reach the same conduct, the explosives statute should include a relational requirement as well.

The government asked the Supreme Court to review the case, noting that the Third and Fifth Circuits had reached the opposite result. The government argued that consistent interpretation of the explosives statute was critical because the statute was crucial to terrorism prosecutions.

Ressam's lawyers unsuccessfully argued that the explosives count was just one of nine in the case, meaning that it would have little impact on Ressam's ultimate sentence and did not require correction. Moreover, they contended, the terrorism argument was a fig leaf, as the government could bring a battery of other charges for similar conduct and rarely used the provision at issue.

On May 19, the Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit's decision.

"Even if the similarity of the original texts of the two statutes might have supported an inference that both included an implicit relationship requirement, their current difference virtually commands the opposite inference," Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for the 8-1 majority.