James, Alphonso, Jr. v. U.S. (04/18/2007)

Question presented: Whether the 11th Circuit erred by holding that all convictions in Florida for attempted burglary qualify as a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. sec. 924(e)?

BY DALIA HATUQA, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE

Alphonso James, Jr., a Fort Myers, Florida man, had already been convicted of three offenses before he was found in possession of a semi-automatic pistol in 2003.

In a federal court in Florida, the government asked for an enhanced sentencing, arguing that James, who was 29 at the time, was an armed career criminal.

To make its case, the government referred to the federal Armed Criminal Career Act (ACCA), which says that any person who commits a felony after having three convictions for a "violent felony" or "serious drug offense" should be sentenced to a minimum of 15 years.

James had been convicted of attempted burglary in 1997, trafficking in illegal drugs in 1998 and trafficking in cocaine by possession of between 200 and 400 grams that same year.

James' attorney, Assistant Federal Defender Craig Crawford, argued to the court that James should not receive an enhanced sentencing because he "only had one countable conviction."

His attempted burglary, Crawford argued, was not a violent felony, nor was the cocaine possession a serious drug offense.

The district court agreed with James in the second case, but it concluded that his attempted burglary conviction was a violent felony.

That crime involved the attempted burglary of the home of a Lehigh, Florida, man. James was not carrying a gun. But according to the government, James had a hammer, which he threw through the window of the man's home before fleeing the scene. He was convicted of the attempted burglary three years later.

Because the court sentencing James decided that only two of his convictions were countable, he was sentenced to 71 months in prison, thereby evading the 15-year minimum prison term.

Neither party was satisfied with the court's decision, and both appealed to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals.

The government appealed the district court's ruling on the trafficking possession conviction; the Assistant Federal Defender cross appealed the court's finding that attempted burglary counted as a prior violent felony within the meaning of the ACCA.

In November 2005, the 11th Circuit dealt a blow to James' case by holding that attempted burglary was a violent felony and that James' trafficking possession in cocaine was a serious drug offense.

The 11th Circuit reasoned that an attempt to commit a violent felony presented the same risk of harm to others as a crime that is carried out.

The court's decision regarding attempted burglary was at odds with the position taken by the 5th and 9th circuits.

"The issue of what constitutes a violent felony has divided the courts of appeals," said Richard Samp, Chief Counsel of the Washington Legal Foundation, a conservative center for public interest law.

"In general terms, the [Supreme] Court grants reviews when there is a conflict between the circuits," he said.

On June 12, 2006, the Supreme Court decided to resolve this conflict by agreeing to review the legal issue of whether attempted burglary qualified as a violent felony pursuant to the ACCA.

In seeking Supreme Court review, Crawford argued that under Florida law, attempted burglary was not a violent felony because it did not pose a serious risk of physical injury to another.

But the government responded that in James' case, it was a violent crime because he had thrown a hammer through the window of the Lehigh man, thus posing "a serious potential risk."

Crawford said the attempted burglary posed merely a "risk of a risk" of violence. "A risk of a risk is not enough of a risk," he added, citing the 9th Circuit's 1994 ruling in U.S. v. Weekley.

In Weekley, the 9th Circuit rejected the argument that attempted burglary posed a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.

In his petition, Crawford also noted, "Congress did not specifically include attempted burglary as a violent offense when it specified burglary as a violent offense."

"The question turns on a very detailed analysis of the statutory language used by Congress," Samp said. "There is ambiguity in that language."

Legal experts say that the issue is a very narrow one, and that a Supreme Court decision will not have major repercussions on the law.

"Some people are getting 15 years minimum and some aren't," said Andrew Leipold, a professor specializing in criminal law at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

"Most of the people to whom the statute may apply are going to jail anyway," he said. "But the question is for how long."

Kent Scheidegger, legal director of the pro-death penalty Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, said a ruling won't affect state laws.

"Habitual criminal laws often involve issues of how to deal with crimes committed in other jurisdictions," he said. "And this appears to be just one more wrinkle in the ongoing problem."

On April 18, 2007, a divided Supreme Court ruled against James, holding that attempted burglary under Florida law does constitute a "violent felony."

Justice Samuel Alito wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Stephen Breyer, Anthony Kennedy and David Souter.

In dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia said the act's "boundaries are ill defined," and criticized the majority for failing to provide guidance to lower court judges.

"We have the responsibility to derive from the text rules of application that will provide notice of what is covered and prevent arbitrary or discriminatory sentencing," said Scalia, who was joined in dissent by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and John Paul Stevens. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate dissent.

Justice Alito took issue with Scalia's criticism, suggesting, "the dissent's alternative approach has more serious disadvantages."

Ohio State University law professor Douglas Berman denounced the outcome, and expressed particular frustration with Justices Breyer and Kennedy's decision to join the majority opinion.

"Neither Justice Breyer nor Justice Kennedy vote as if he is genuinely troubled by broad applications of harsh mandatory minimum sentences," Berman said. "They both are good at talking the talk, but neither walk the walk."