Dolan, Barbara v. U.S. Postal Service, et al. (02/22/2006)
Dolan, Barbara v. U.S. Postal Service, et al. (02/22/2006)
Question presented: Whether a cause of action for personal injury resulting from the negligent delivery of mail is a claim "arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter" that, under 28 U.S.C. 2680(b), is excepted from the government's waiver of sovereign immunity in the Federal Tort Claims Act?
BY VAIL ROMEYN, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE
On Aug. 25, 2001, a postal worker deposited the mail on the porch of Barbara Dolan's Pennsylvania home. The pile left behind consisted of letters, packages and magazines.
Later, Dolan slipped and fell on the mail and suffered injuries as a result of the fall. She filed an administrative complaint with the U.S. Postal Service, which was denied on April 18, 2002.
Six months later, Dolan filed a complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act against the USPS with the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Her husband, Michael Dolan, also filed an FTCA claim stating that his wife's injuries had precluded her from fully performing her spousal role.
As a general practice, the United States has sovereign immunity and cannot be sued. Whether the government can claim sovereign immunity is "one of subject-matter jurisdiction," but Congress can waive it when a government employee acts "negligently" while doing his/her "official duties."
However, there are a few exceptions. One exception is section 28 U.S.C. " 2680, which says the FTCA immunity does not apply to claims that arise out of the "loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission" of postal materials.
The government moved to dismiss, citing lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The question before the District Court was whether the postal worker acted negligently by placing the mail items on the porch.
Judge Mary McLaughlin ruled that if the government could be held liable for accidents, such as those resulting from the delivery of the mail, it would potentially disrupt the process that ensures "that millions of pieces of mail handled by the USPS are delivered efficiently."
In addition, she noted that the government would be exposed to "excessive or fraudulent" claims, since most of the delivery process happens, with "no witness to observe the events after the completion of delivery."
In so finding, Judge McLaughlin defined the transmission of the mail as starting when the USPS receives the materials and ending when the USPS delivers those materials.
She noted that the legislative history of section 2680(b) shows that its purpose was to prevent the courts from being overwhelmed with lawsuits "generated from unavoidable mishaps" as a result of the daily process of delivering the mail. There was nothing "out of the ordinary" about the mail being deposited on Barbara Dolan's porch, she found, adding that the USPS does not "monitor" how the postal materials they deposit are retrieved by its customers.
On Feb. 10, 2004, a 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed.
In its unanimous opinion, written by Judge Jane Roth, the appeals court agreed that the issue was whether the exception to the FTCA waiver applied to the "negligent transmission of letters or postal matters" and that the legislative history indicated a Congressional intent to protect government from claims that are an unavoidable mishaps resulting from the "ordinary accepted operations" of the USPS.
In its opinion, the 3rd Circuit did, however, give nod to the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals' seemingly opposite ruling in 2004 in Raila v. U.S. In its ruling, the 2nd Circuit found that "the words, ‘negligent transmission' are limited to the loss or miscarriage of postal material." The 3rd Circuit further disagreed with the 2nd Circuit, saying that if there is any latitude in the "ambiguities in the language" for a waiver of sovereign immunity, the court must find in favor of the government.
The split among the circuits is significant.
However, also at the heart of the case for Dolan's attorney, James Radmore, is the fact that the USPS is no longer offering an exclusive service.
Private companies are now competing with the USPS and "that makes it fair game," Radmore said.
The FTCA says that the U.S. Post Office, an arm of the federal government, can be sued for anything a regular citizen can be sued for, barring a few notable exceptions, including the one mentioned above.
If private companies such as Federal Express and United Parcel Service offer the same type of shipping and disbursement as the postal service, the USPS must be held to the same liability as the private companies.
Though this issue was not addressed directly by the 3rd Circuit, Radmore believes it is a hinge-point of the case in front of the U.S. Supreme Court.
In opposition to review, the U.S. Solicitor General's office argued that the 3rd Circuit "correctly interpreted" section 2680(b) and that any "narrow and nascent" conflict between that decision and Raila "does not merit this Court's intervention."
On April 25, 2005, the Court accepted review in the case, and on Feb. 22, 2006, the justices reversed, holding 7-1 that Dolan's claim is not foreclosed by the postal exception in section 2680(b). Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy concluded that the term "negligent transmission" does not include basic slips and falls to individuals, but is limited to failures to transmit mail or damage done to its contents.
As to the "specter of frivolous slip-and-fall claims inundating the Postal Service," Kennedy responded that it is no different than the risks shared by any business that does home deliveries.
In lone dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas conceded that the language of "negligent transmission" is ambiguous but argued to resolve it in the government's favor, thereby preserving its sovereign immunity.
Justice Samuel Alito, who was not on the bench when the case was orally argued, did not participate in the decision.
