Rompilla, Ronald v. Beard, Jeffrey (secy, PA Dept. of Corrections) (06/20/2005)

Questions presented: (1) Does Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) require a lift-without-parole jury instruction where the only alternative to a death sentence under state law is life without the possibility of parole? (2) Has a defendant received unconsitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel at a capital sentencing hearing where counsel does not review the defendant's prior conviction record which would provide mitigating evidence regarding the defendant's traumatic childhood and mental health impairments?

BY LORI FRADKIN, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE

On Jan. 14, 1988, James Scanlon's body was found in a pool of blood at the Cozy Corner Café in Allentown, Penn. The 61-year-old tavern owner had been stabbed and set on fire, and authorities determined that the perpetrator had entered the building through the window of the restroom.

Police matched the sneakers of Ronald Rompilla with the footprints at the crime scene, found the blood type of the victim on Rompilla's shoes and discovered Scanlon's wallet in the bushes outside Rompilla's motel room. Rompilla had been a customer of the café between 1 am and 2 am that evening, and police learned he had gone to the bathroom about 10 times. He also had previous felony convictions including raping and robbing a female bar owner.

A jury in Lehigh County Court convicted Rompilla of first-degree murder later that year, and in the penalty phase of the trial, jurors asked whether the defendant would be eligible for parole if given life in prison. Judge David Mellenberg responded, "I can't answer that question." He also refused to answer questions about the defendant's prior sentences and rehabilitation possibilities. The jury then sentenced Rompilla to death.

Rompilla appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of his trial, an infringement on his 6th Amendment right. He argued that his lawyers had failed to use school, medical, court and prison records as mitigating factors. Such documents would have shown his low IQ within the mentally retarded range, unstable family life as a child and problems with alcohol. He also said his counsel had not interviewed two of his sisters who could have painted a picture of his traumatic family life.

His attorneys, public defenders Frederick Charles and Maria Dantos, said they'd interviewed several family members about Rompilla's history, but his siblings never mentioned his childhood neglect, mental problems or any circumstances that might help his case. The defense attorneys also said health experts evaluating Rompilla did not request any of his records.

Written by Chief Justice Robert N.C. Nix in 1995, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinion affirmed both the conviction and the sentence.

Rompilla had to exhaust all state remedies before he could have his appeal heard in federal court, so he filed a petition under the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act. The PCRA court determined that because the health care experts did not ask for additional information, "it was hardly unreasonable or ineffective for defense counsel to have relied upon their opinions." It also concluded that family members were interviewed "in a detailed manner" by trial counsel. The PCRA, therefore, denied Rompilla's petition for relief.

In a 1998 opinion by Justice Russell Nigro, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court again affirmed the sentence with a 6-1 vote. Only Chief Justice John Flaherty dissented, saying he would have set aside the death sentence based on the 1994 case Simmons v. South Carolina. And expanding on the precedent, Flaherty said juries should receive instructions for all capital cases.

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Simmons that if the prosecution argues future dangerousness, the jury must be instructed that life imprisonment means life without parole. Rompilla's lawyers asserted that prosecutors put future dangerousness at issue during the sentencing phase by telling jurors that Rompilla was a violent recidivist and a frightening repeat offender who had learned to leave no witnesses.

Rompilla sought habeas relief in federal court.

In U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Judge Ronald Buckwalter accepted Rompilla's argument about ineffective assistance but rejected his argument about jury instructions. He explained that the state court rulings contained "no in-depth analysis of what the duty to investigate consists of in a case of this nature; and…a lack of discussion of alcoholism pertaining to…[Rompilla]." Buckwalter granted Rompilla habeas relief and set aside his death sentence—about 12 years after his conviction by jury trial.

Prosecutors then appealed the case to the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeal, and Rompilla cross-appealed for reconsideration of his Simmons claim. The court ruled 2-1 in January 2004 that Rompilla was not entitled to habeas relief.

Regarding the argument that the trial lawyers had been ineffective, Judge Samuel Alito Jr. wrote for the majority, "[I]t appears to us that Rompilla is now arguing that his trial counsel was constitutionally derelict in failing to take all steps that might have been pursued by the most resourceful defense attorneys with bountiful investigative support…That is more than the Sixth Amendment demands."

In response to Rompilla's claim that prosecutors put his future dangerousness at issue, Alito wrote, "Proving past crimes that may cause jurors to worry about future dangerousness is quite different from arguing that a defendant presents a future threat."

Judge Dolores Sloviter dissented and said she would have granted Rompilla a writ of habeas corpus because of his ineffective trial counsel and because of the trial judge's refusal to explain to the inquiring jurors that a sentence of life imprisonment would prohibit parole. On the first ground, she cited American Bar Association guidelines that defense attorneys "should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor." She said Rompilla's lawyers had failed to fulfill this obligation.

She further disagreed with the majority's interpretation of Simmons because she believed that an "express argument" of future dangerousness was unnecessary to require jury instructions of life means life. She felt the judge had not explained Pennsylvania law to the jurors, even when the jury requested clarification. Concluding her dissent, she said, "Truth in advertising is now the byword of this generation. Truth in instructing the jury as to the effect of the sentence in a capital case is at least as important."

The 3rd Circuit voted 6-5 not to accept the case for a rehearing, so Rompilla's lawyers petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review.

In opposition to Rompilla's petition, Amy Zapp of Pennsylvania's Attorney General's office, argues that the federal trial court overstepped its bounds when it granted Rompilla relief because it independently evaluated Rompilla's claims. She said it should have decided only whether the state court ruling was "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application of" federal law.

This case has serious implications for defendants in capital cases, according to David Bruck who defended Simmons in 1994. Bruck contends that prosecutors go out of their way to avoid the words "future dangerousness," even though they put that exact thought in the minds of the jurors. He also said Pennsylvania is the only state that isn't straightforward with the jury about the lack of parole in death penalty cases, despite a widespread misconception that people sentenced to life imprisonment will be back on the streets after seven or so years.

With regard to ineffectiveness of counsel, Bruck explained that the Supreme Court has moved recently toward citing ABA guidelines in their opinions and holding lawyers more accountable for their responsibilities to their clients. Pennsylvania has had an "absolutely atrocious" record of providing counsel, he said.

On Sept. 28, 2004, the Supreme Court accepted review in the case and allowed Rompilla to have his case heard without costs.

According to Bruck, if the Court sides with Rompilla, the prosecution will have two options: "throw in the towel and say, ‘okay, we'll give him life'" or pick a new jury to try the case again.

On June 20, 2005, a divided Court reversed, holding 5-4 that Rompilla's lawyers were bound to make a reasonable effort to uncover mitigating evidence in his prior conviction file even if the strategy at sentending was likely to be to take on the evidence of aggravation.

Justice David Souter wrote the majority opinion. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the dissent for himself, Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. In it, they noted that the majority opinion effectively characterized not only "two committed criminal defense attorneys as ineffective," but labelled as incompetent the work done by the three mental health professionals who also examined Rompilla.