Illinois v. Caballes, Roy (01/24/2005)

Questions presented: Whether a reasonable articulable suspicion is needed under the 4th Amendment's search and seizure clause to conduct a canine sniff during a routine traffic stop?

BY ADRIANA MATEUS, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE

On a rainy afternoon in 1998, Roy Caballes was moving back to Chicago from Las Vegas. It was Nov. 12 and after 5 p.m. when Caballes, driving alone in a 1998 Grand Marquis, was stopped by Illinois Police Trooper Daniel Gillette for going six miles per hour over the speed limit on Interstate Route 80 in La Salle County.

Upon informing Caballes that he was being stopped for speeding, Gillette requested his driver's license, vehicle registration and proof of insurance. Gillette asked Caballes to move his car to the shoulder of the road and out of traffic, and then to sit in the squad car with him. He informed Caballes that he was going to give him a written warning.

While in the police car, Gillette asked more questions of Caballes including his destination, as well as whether [Gillette] could check his vehicle, a request Caballes did not agree to.

Gillette called the police dispatcher to inquire about the validity of Caballes' license, and to check for any outstanding warrants. As Gillette began to write the warning ticket, he also requested a criminal background check from the dispatcher, received a response and asked Caballes whether he had had any previous arrests, which Caballes denied. However, information from the dispatcher said that Caballes had had two prior arrests for distribution of marijuana.

While Gillette was writing the ticket, a second trooper arrived. Trooper Craig Graham of the Illinois Police Drug Interdiction Team had with him a drug-detection dog. After walking around Caballes' car and based on the canine's alert, marijuana was discovered in the trunk of Caballes' car. Caballes was arrested and later charged with one count of cannabis trafficking.

Prior to trial, Caballes' motion to suppress the evidence found in the trunk of Caballes' car was denied. Following a bench trial, Caballes was convicted on one count of cannabis trafficking, sentenced to 12 years in prison and ordered to pay a street value fine of $256,136.

On appeal, Caballes' lawyers argued that the motion to suppress should have been granted because the trooper had prolonged the stop based on time required to complete the "business portion," of the stop by requesting criminal history, Gillette issued a written warning when a verbal warning was within his discretion, and Gillette did not have probable cause to search the vehicle, given the unreliability of dog alerts.

In its decision, the Illinois Appellate Court unanimously concluded that a police officer could detain the driver after a minor traffic stop and conduct a speedy warrant check if the officer's suspicion was stirred during initial inquiries. According to statements made by Gillette, there was reasonable articulable suspicion based on factors he noted during the stop, Caballes was dressed up even though traveling cross country and without a job at time of arrest, the vehicle smelled like air freshener, and Caballes acted nervous even after Gillette informed him he would only receive a warning.

On Nov. 20, 2003, in a 4-3 decision, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the use of a drug-detection dog during a legitimate traffic stop violated the defendant's 4th Amendment rights. "The police impermissibly broadened the scope of the traffic stop into a drug investigation because there were no specific, articulable facts to support the use of a canine sniff," wrote Judge J. Thomas Kilbride for the bare majority.

The majority applied a two-part "Terry" test to determine whether the officers' actions were justified, and whether actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances initially leading to the arrest. The Terry test as it has come to be known stems from a 1968 Supreme Court case on prolongation of a police stop.

Relying also on People v. Cox, another Illinois case concerning the suppression of evidence obtained by a canine sniff, the court reasoned that beyond the duration of the stop, the trooper improperly broadened the scope of the stop by employing a canine sniff without "specific and articulable facts," concluding that the trial court should have granted Caballes the motion to suppress evidence.

Justice Robert Thomas, in a dissent, said the majority ignored previous cases in its decision, which had already established that a canine sniff was not a search under the 4th Amendment and therefore that using a canine did not transform seizure of a legitimately detained vehicle into a search. In addition, the justice said, because a canine sniff is not a search, the police did not need probable cause or reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.

In seeking review by the U.S. Supreme Court,the state of Illinois said the Court should seek to ensure uniformity on an important and recurring question of whether a sniff is a search or merely a 4th Amendment non-event.

On April 6, 2004, the Supreme Court accepted review in the case.The Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police and the Major Cities Chiefs Association submitted an amicus brief in support of the State of Illinois.

"The Illinois Supreme Court decision restricts what has proved to be an invaluable tool for police to detect narcotics use," said James Sotos, counsel for the amici.

In addition, according to the web site of the U.S. Border Protection, the canine enforcement program of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the use of canines has led to more than 130,000 narcotics seizures.

Various law enforcement teams, including the Department of Homeland Security, use canines, and they continue to be used to detect explosives and other potential threats in the "war on terrorism."

In response, Caballes' lawyers argued that police officers did not offer sufficient justification for employing a canine sniff. While there's no rigid time limitation established by the courts regarding length of time a traffic stop may last, the detention must be "temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."

On Jan. 24, 2005, the Supreme Court reversed by a vote of 6-2, holding that the dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that revealed no information other than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess did not violate Caballes' 4th Amendment rights. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the concise majority opinion, concluding that it was "entirely consistent" with the Court's decision in Kyllo v. U.S. that the use of a thermal-imaging device to detect the growth of marijuana in a home constituted an unlawful search. "The legitimate expectation that information about perfectly lawful activity will remain private is categorically distinguishable from [Caballes'] hopes or expectations concerning the nondetection of contraband in the trunk of his car," Stevens reasoned.

Justices David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented. Justice Ginsburg was troubled that the dog sniff was not "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances [justifiying] the [initial] interference," in part because a drug-detection dog is an intimidating animal. "Under today's decision," she wrote, "every traffic stop could become an occasion to call in the dogs, to the distress and embarrassment of the law-abiding population."

Justice Souter was also troubled by the specter of dog invasions. "The infallible dog, however, is a creature of legal fiction," Souter wrote. "Although the Supreme Court of Illinois did not get into the sniffing averages of drug dogs, their supposed infallibility is belied by judicial opinions describing well-trained animals sniffing and alerting with less than perfect accuracy, whether owing to errors by their handlers, the limitations of the dogs themselves, or even the pervasive contamination of currency by cocaine."

Chief Justice William Rehnquist took no part in the decision.