Deck, Carman v. Missouri (05/23/2005)

Question presented: Is it unconstitutional to force a capital defendant to proceed through the penalty phase while shackled and handcuffed in view of the jury, and if so, does the burden fall on the state to show that the error was hamless beyond a reasonable doubt or on the defendant to show that he was prejudiced?

BY BETSY JUDELSON & ALISON GRANITO, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE

With his hands handcuffed to a belly chain and his feet in leg irons, Carman Deck was sentenced to death for the 1996 execution-style murder of an elderly couple in their home.

It was the second time that a Missouri jury had sentenced him to die for the gruesome double-murder.

Deck, who was originally convicted of murder in 1998, successfully won an appeal in 2002 to overturn his death sentence. Although the Missouri Supreme Court upheld his conviction, the court found errors during the sentencing phase of his trial may have led the jury to wrongly impose the death penalty.

As a result, the court ordered that Deck be given a new sentencing hearing – with a new jury – to determine if he should spend the rest of his life in prison or die by lethal injection.

Prior to jury selection, Deck's attorney requested that his client be allowed to attend the trial in plain clothes, without handcuffs, so that the jury would not be biased against Deck and perceive him as dangerous.

The judge denied the motion.

Once jury selection began, Deck's attorney again objected to the restraints.

The judge denied his objection, stating only that "he has been convicted and will remain in leg irons and a belly chain."

During jury selection, the jurors were questioned about whether the shackles would bias them against the defendant. None responded that they would be influenced by the restraints.

Prior to swearing in the jury, the defense attorney once again renewed his objection and asked the court to remove the entire panel of jurors because they had seen Deck in shackles.

His request was denied.

During the trial, there were numerous times when the jury saw the handcuffed Deck "paraded into the court room," and standing when jurors entered the room, according to Deck's attorneys.

When testimony was completed, the jury deliberated for six hours before sentencing Deck once again to two death sentences – one for each of his first degree murder convictions.

Deck appealed his sentence to the Missouri Supreme Court on nine grounds, including that his constitutional fair trial rights were violated when he was forced to wear leg irons and a belly chain during sentencing.

"One of the key things that the jury is to determine in penalty phase is whether the defendant will be dangerous if he is sentenced to life without parole," said Rosemarie Percival, the public defender who is representing Deck in his current appeal.

"When they [saw] him – particularly with extreme restraints – the jury assume[d] he did something, or tried to escape and can't follow rules even in the court room," said Percival. "The logical conclusion is that he's going to be causing trouble or maybe hurting someone."

On May 24, 2004, the Missouri Supreme Court upheld Deck's death sentence.

Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Ronnie White held that it was within the court's discretion to restrain the defendant to "maintain order and security in the courtroom."

Although the trial judge had not explained his reasoning -- or articulated a comprehensive list of factors -- White held that there was ample evidence to support the judge's decision to restrain Deck. The convict was, according to White, a flight risk -- "he was a repeat offender and evidence from the guilt phase of his trial indicated that he killed two victims to avoid being returned to custody."

White held that even if the trial court had erred in ordering Deck shackled, there was "nothing more than speculation" to indicate that the outcome of the sentencing hearing would have been different.

According to White, Deck's attorney had not provided the court sufficient evidence to prove that the jury was aware of Deck's restraints during trial, or to explain how the restraints prohibited Deck from assisting in his defense.

"Neither being viewed in shackles by the [jury] prior to trial, nor being viewed while restrained throughout the entire trial, alone, is proof of prejudice."

Moreover, White wrote, the jurors had been questioned about their biases, and all had indicated that his appearance would not affect their decision.

Deck asked the U.S. Supreme Court to hear his case – solely to consider whether his rights were violated when the court restrained him during sentencing. If his rights were violated, Deck argued, it should be the responsibility of the state to prove that the error had been harmless – rather than his responsibility to prove prejudice.

Although the Supreme Court has held that "no person shall be tried while shackled and gagged except as a last resort," its decision is grounded in the fact that during trial the defendant is presumed to be innocent. The restraints, according to the court, compromise that presumption of innocence.

The Court has yet to consider whether the same heightened standard applies to the sentencing phase where the defendant has already been convicted of the crime.

On Oct. 18, 2004, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.

During the Court's oral arguments on March 1, 2005, at least one justice called the state's position extreme and several appeared unsatisfied -- given Deck's prior good behavior in court -- that the trial judge had acted reasonably in forcing the leg irons, handcuffs and belly chain on Deck, apparently without considering alternatives or explaining the reasons behind his decision.

The defense argued that the belly chain and leg irons were not only unwarranted, but extreme. Therefore, the restraints violated Deck's right to a fair and reliable sentencing under the 8th Amendment because they gave the jury a false impression that he was an imminent threat.

Justice David Souter called the shackles a "visible" argument that make the defendant appear so dangerous that jurors can't rely on court security for protection from him or to keep him from escaping.

"There's no question he was dangerous when he committed the murders, but I don't know that that means he's dangerous in a courtroom." Souter said.

The state argued that Deck's conviction for two murders alone was enough to justify the level of restraint.

"The bottom line is restraining somebody who's been convicted of murder is not in any way unreliable or misleading," said Assistant State's Attorney Cheryl Nield, who argued the case for Missouri.

"The bottom line from the other point of view is that shackles are always prejudicial, and you try to have the scales evenly balanced when you're deciding whether the man should die or not," Justice John Paul Stevens said in reply.

Rosemary Percival argued for Deck: "Shackling a defendant basically places a thumb on death's side of the scale and dehumanizes the defendant, making it easier for the jury to find that he is worthy of a death sentence. This Court goes to extraordinary measures to ensure that the defendant sentenced to be executed is afforded process that will guarantee, as much as humanly possible, that the sentence was not imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice or mistake."

Under questioning from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Nield conceded that "the burden is for the state to show that the restraints were reasonable, were not completely out of proportion."

O'Connor asked her to identify in the record where the court explained why the level or restraint imposed on Deck was reasonable and questioned, along with Breyer, why the judge did not enumerate his reasons for that level of restraint in a finding if it is incumbent upon the state to prove that the leg irons and belly chain were reasonable.

"Do you take the position that they're free to impose shackles in every case, even a traffic offense, if the prosecutor wishes to do it, without any justification?" O'Connor asked, calling the state's position, that all defendants can be placed in restraints based solely on their conviction, extreme.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg echoed the sentiment.

"He has been convicted and, therefore, we can keep him in chains," she said. "The judge seems to be saying once a person is convicted, at least of murder it's fair game."

Several justices also queried if judges should have to spell out the reasons that the restraints are necessary.

"What if the judge had specifically stated, 'I'm putting him in irons because the man is violent enough towards himself or others that I'm worried about the safety of the jury?'" Justice Antonin Scalia asked.

Justice Anthony Kennedy was skeptical of the state's position that the leg irons and belly chain were not visible to the jury because the defense never indicated for the record during the trial that the jury could see them.

He also questioned how far the state should be allowed to go. "Could they put him in a cage?" he asked.

The justices also made reference to upholding dignity in the courts.

"I think you just have to say that this is inherently inconsistent with the atmosphere we want to have in a courtroom," said Kennedy.

On May 23, 2005, the Court held 7-2 that it was unconstitutional to shackle Deck during his sentencing before a jury.

Justice Stephen Breyer wrote the Court's majority opinion. Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia dissented.