Jones, Edith, et al. v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. (05/03/2004)

Questions presented: Does the four-year "catch-all" limitations period of 28 U.S.C. ?1658 apply to new causes of action created by public law 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which were codified at 42 U.S.C. ?1981(a) and (b)?

BY SHWETA GOVINDARAJAN, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE

On Nov. 25, 1996, Edith Jones filed a class action suit in federal court in Chicago alleging race discrimination against R.R. Donnelley and Sons, a commercial printing company. The class of employees, all African-American, were let go from the companys Chicago manufacturing division after it closed in July 1994.

According to the plaintiffs lawyers, the companys white employees were transferred to another facility. However, only three of the 586 African American employees were reassigned.

"We dont dispute their right to close the division," said Candace Gorman, a lawyer for the plaintiffs. "But theyre handpicking white employees to go to other divisions."

The plaintiffs claimed racial discrimination in the workplace as well as the existence of a racially hostile work environment. According to Gorman, racist graffiti was sprayed on the walls of the plant and would not be erased for long periods of time.

"It was an atmosphere that condoned the racism going on," Gorman said.

Gorman conceded that the plaintiffs' claim had passed the two-year statute of limitations under U.S.C section 1981. Section 1981 does not come with its own statue of limitations but falls under Illinois two-year timeframe for personal injury claims.

After researching other avenues, she filed the lawsuit under the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which broadens the definition of section 1981 and allows individuals to pursue claims of discrimination based on events that happened during their employment.

The Civil Rights Act was passed after Congress enacted U.S.C section 1658 in 1990. Section 1658 provided a federal "catch-all" four-year statute of limitations that applies to any civil action arising under an act of congress enacted after 1990.

Donnelley moved for a partial summary judgment against plaintiffs whose employment concluded before Nov. 26, 1994. But the judge ruled that the plaintiffs' claim fell under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 whose statute of limitations, according to section 1658, is four years.

"[The district court's decision] is absolutely literalist textual interpretation run amok," said Tom Abram, a lawyer for Donnelley.

According to Abram, the Civil Rights Act is an amendment to section 1981, and cannot be used as an umbrella for the plaintiffs' claims.

"You can't bring a cause of action just under 1981b [the 1991 Civil Rights Act]," Abram said. "What [the plaintiffs] are trying to argue is ahistorical and counterfactual."

On Sept 16, 2002, a 7th Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously reversed, holding that section 1658 "does not provide the applicable statute of limitations for claims of discrimination based on actions occurring after the employment relationship is formed."

According to the 7th Circuit, the case asked them to determine whether the 1996 suit alleging race discrimination and a racially hostile work environment, brought under 42 U.S.C section 1981, fell under the "catch-all" four year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C section 1658 or the two year personal injury statute of limitations of the state of Illinois.

The plaintiffs argued that the Supreme Court has held that section 1981 does not extend "to problems that may arise later from conditions of continuing employment" and grants the right of "access to legal process that will address and resolve contract-law claims without regard to race." They also argued that in 1990, Congress enacted section 1658 that provided a four-year statute of limitations for ""civil actions rising under an Act of Congress. Because Congress amended section 1981 through the 1991 Civil Rights Act, the plaintiffs contended their lawsuit is subject to section 1658's statute of limitations.

"As with any statutory interpretation question, determination of the meaning and application of section 1658 to the section 1981 claims at issue must begin with the statutory language of both provisions," Judge Kenneth Ripple wrote.

"We respectfully disagree that the plain language of section 1658, standing alone, compels the conclusion that section 1658 must apply to every statute subject to any amendatory action by Congress. The language of section 1658 addresses only a civil action that arises under an act adopted after section 1658s effective date. The language simply does address the eventuality when a cause of action arises under two different Acts, one enacted before and one enacted after the effective date of section 1658."

In concluding, Ripple decided, "It is highly significant that, when Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 with the amendments to section 1981 contained therein, it is believed that the applicable state statute of limitations for personal injury claims would continue to apply to section 1981 claims [we determine] that section 1658 does not provide the applicable statute of limitations for claims of discrimination based on actions occurring after the employment relationship is formed. Instead, the statute of limitations for those claims, as for all section 1981 claims, remains the most analogous statute of limitations, here Illinoiss two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries."

"The 1991 Civil Rights Act is a new law," Gorman said. "It incorporates an old law, but that doesn't mean its not a new law. If its a whole law, then the four year statute must apply."

On May 19, 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted review in the case, and a year later, on May 3, 2004, the Court unanimously reversed, holding against Donnelley that Jones' claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 are not time-barred.

In writing the opinion for the unanimous Court, Justice John Paul Stevens noted that because the meaning of "arising under" in sect. 1658 is ambiguous, the Court needed to divine Congress' intent from the context in which it was enacted.

That intent involved attempts to enact a uniform limitations statute so problems stemming from the settled practice of borrowing state statutes of limitations could be minimized, Stevens stated, and concluded that Jones' claims all arose under the 1991 Act in the sense that they were made possible by the Act.