Illinois v. Lidster, Robert (01/13/2004)

Questions presented: Whether Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000), prohibits police officers from conducting a checkpoint organized to investigate a prior offense, stopping all oncoming motorists to hand out flyers about the offense and arresting motorists for drunk driving?

BY: KELLY HESSEDAL, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE

On Aug. 30, 1997, the Lombard police department set up a roadblock to investigate a fatal hit-and-run accident that took place in the Chicago suburb one week earlier. The police specifically set up the roadblock in the same location and around the same time of day that the accident occurred in an attempt to find witnesses.

The police stopped vehicles and handed out flyers. They claimed they did not use the roadblock for crime-detection purposes, but rather, to gather information about the existing crime. Motorists were stopped on average for 10 to 15 seconds and were not asked for their names, drivers licenses or their insurance information.

Robert S. Lidster approached the checkpoint and nearly struck Detective Vasil with his vehicle, according to the police. After speaking with Lidster, Vasil smelled alcohol on his breath and also noticed his speech was slurred. He directed Lidster to another officer who instructed him to perform several sobriety tests. Lidster was arrested and charged with driving under the influence of alcohol.

However, Lidster argued the roadblock was unconstitutional. He claimed he was seized without suspicion and arrested in violation of the 4th Amendment. He moved to quash his arrest and suppress the evidence of his offense.

His motion was denied. During testimony, Lidster denied almost hitting the officer with his vehicle and said that he had successfully completed the sobriety tests.

The trial court ruled that Lidster was guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol. The court sentenced him to one year of conditional discharge and required him to participate in the "Sheriff's Work Alternative Program," as well as pay a fine of $200.

Lidster appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court, arguing that the balancing test developed by state and federal courts did not affirm that the public interest in conducting the roadblock outweighed intruding on the rights of innocent motorists.

On March 30, 2001, the Appellate Court unanimously sided with Lidster, stating that under Indianapolis v. Edmond, Illinoiss roadblock resulted in an unreasonable seizure. In Edmond the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a roadblock program was unconstitutional if its sole purpose was to uncover evidence of "ordinary criminal wrongdoing." The Appellate Court ruled that the purpose of the states roadblock fell within these guidelines.

"This is the type of routine investigate work that the police must do every day and does not justify the extraordinary means chosen to further the investigation," Judge Robert McLaren wrote.

"Such unbridled use of checkpoints also leaves open the possibility of police subterfuge, using the pretense of investigating some infamous crime to stop motorists based on the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime," he wrote.

This time the state of Illinois appealed, arguing that the Appellate Court did not evaluate their case under Indianapolis v. Edmond correctly. The state asserted that the court extended the law in Edmond to "prohibit all roadblocks used to investigate crimes." The state maintained their position that the checkpoint was "reasonable" and constitutional.

The reasonableness test involves evaluating the amount of intrusion on someone's 4th Amendment's rights in terms of the programs promotion of state and public interest.

In October 2002, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.

"The right of an individual to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is an indispensable freedom, not a mere luxury," Justice Charles Freeman wrote.

"As the protector of the constitutional rights of all citizens of this state, this court is commanded to draw a line at roadblocks designed primarily to serve the general interest in crime control. Without such a line, the fourth amendment will do little to prevent intrusive searches and seizures from becoming a routine part of American life," he wrote.

On May 5, 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted review in the case and allowed Lidster to have his case heard without costs.

"If we win this case, we will continue to protect our liberties under the 4th Amendment," said Elaine Sofferman, the attorney arguing Lidster's case in the Supreme Court.

Ohio and 13 other states submitted an amicus (friend-of-the-court) brief to the Supreme Court, voicing concern that if the decision isn't reversed, officers will be prevented from initiating legitimate contact with citizens who happen to be in automobiles.

"The need for open channels of communication between police and the public, and the need for officers to feel they can take action reasonably calculated to advance a pending investigation possess enhanced significance in an age where our Nation seeks to protect itself not only against the traditional threat of conventional crime, but against international terrorism as well," they wrote.

"We're in a different situation these days, because of post 911," said A. Scott Chinn, the attorney who represented Indianapolis in the Edmond case.

"We have not come up with any new roadblocks or traffic-related investigation tools related to terrorism. Because were worried about nuclear facilities, power plants, and vehicle access to those things, its not hard to imagine that someone will want to come up with a roadblock plan to address those security issues. I wonder if the Court will adjust its thinking as to what is reasonable and what is not reasonable in a post-911 era," he said.

The defense, however, poses a different question. "In light of terrorist attacks, do we need more guidance to make sure the police dont go too far?" asked G. Joseph Weller, Lidster's attorney.

On Jan. 13, 2004, the Court sided with Illinois, distinguishing Edmond, and holding that police can set up a checkpoint to gather information. Writing for the Court, Justice Stephen Breyer noted that in Edwards, the roadblock was directed at determining if drivers and passengers were committing a crime, and therefore couldn't be done constitutionally without appropriate 4th Amendment search protections.

Here, where the stop was for information, the need for 4th Amendment protection is not as keen, Breyer reasoned, because the concept of individualized suspicion has little role to play, and the stops are less likely to provoke anxiety or to prove intrusive.

Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred, but argued to remand the case to the Illinois courts for a decision on the reasonableness of the stops.

"Such a seizure may seem relatively innocuous to some, but annoying to others who are forced to wait for several minutes when the line of cars is lengthenedfor example, by a surge of vehicles leaving a factory at the end of a shift," Stevens wrote, urging that the lower courts are in a better position to analyze the particular local conditions and practices at play in the case.