Sprietsma, Rex v. Mercury Marine (12/03/2002)

Questions presented: Does the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 preempt state common law causes of action based on the manufacturers failure to install propeller guards on boat engines?

BY: BING HA HONG, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE

In July 1995, while boating in Tennessee, Jeanne Sprietsma fell from a motor boat and was struck by the motors propeller blades. As a result, she suffered serious injuries and later died. The boat was equipped with a 115-horsepower outboard motor, which did not contain a propeller guard. Mercury Marine designed, manufactured and sold the motor.

Rex Sprietsma, Jeannes husband, filed a wrongful death suit against Mercury Marine, alleging that the motorboat was defectively designed because it did not include a propeller guard.

Illinois courts dismissed the suit on the grounds that the claims were preempted by federal law.

On Aug. 16, 2001, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, which preempts state laws and regulations not identical to regulations prescribed under the act, preempted state claims. Though Sprietsmas claims regarded health and safety concerns which are generally considered state matters, the court decided that the federal interest in regulation of maritime activity took precedence.

The court noted that the U.S. Coast Guard in 1998 considered whether to require manufacturers to install propeller guards but because of safety concerns, decided to take no action. The court determined that the lack of action meant that requiring propeller guards was not appropriate.

"We believe the Coast Guards failure to promulgate a propeller guard requirement here equates to a ruling that such regulation is appropriate pursuant to the policy of the FBSA," said Justice Rita Garman in the courts majority opinion. "A damage award would, in effect, create a propeller guard requirement, thus frustrating the objectives of Congress in promulgating the FBSA."

Chief Justice Moses Harrison II criticized the majority in a lone dissent for bending over backwards to favor preemption when it wasnt warranted. "Contrary to my colleagues' view, this is not a case where our authority to make an independent interpretation of federal law should yield to considerations of uniformity. If our view of federal law differs from that of the lower federal courts and the conflict proves problematic, the United States Supreme Court may grant review to resolve the conflict," Harrison wrote. "We should not perpetuate an erroneous interpretation of the law merely because it has been endorsed by some lower federal court judges. Uniformity is no virtue if it means being uniformly wrong."

"This case is highly significant to all businesses whose activities are subject to industry-specific federal regulation, as it is likely to clarify the scope of the implied-preemption doctrine," said attorneys for Mayer, Brown and Platt, which are representing Mercury Marine, in a brief.

This case is important because people who are injured by dangerous products need to have a remedy that the people who make those products will be held accountable, said Michael J. Quirk, attorney for Sprietsma. The federal governments lack of regulation means that consumers lack a place to address those grievances and obtain redress, he said.

On Jan. 22, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case, and on Dec. 3, 2002, the Court unanimously reversed.

Writing for the Court, Justice John Paul Stevens concluded that the FBSA does not preempt state common-law claims.

Noting that the FBSA contains an express preemption clause that does not mention common-law claims, Stevens wrote that it made sense for Congress not to preempt common-law claims, which necessarily perform an important remedial role in compensating accident victims.