Price, Warden v. Vincent, Duyonn (05/19/2003)

Questions presented: 1. Whether the Michigan Supreme Court's conclusion that the trial court did not direct a verdict of acquittal is a factual finding entitled to deference on habeas corpus review. 2. Whether Vincent was twice placed in jeopardy by the action of the trial court in first granting a motion for directed verdict on the issue of first degree murder, and shortly thereafter withdrawing its grant, where both the initial decision and its recall occurred out of the presence of the jury.

BY: LAUREN MENSCH, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE

On March 31, 1992, Duyonn Andre Vincent stood in front of a trial judge in Michigans Genesse County Circuit Court and thought he was acquitted on charges of first-degree murder.

At the close of the prosecutions case against him, Vincents lawyer asked the judge for a directed verdict to acquit Vincent of first-degree murder. Vincents lawyer argued that the prosecutions evidence did not prove Vincent had committed a premeditated and deliberate murder.

Judge Donald Freeman seemed to agree with Vincents request.

"Nothing else?" Freeman asked of prosecutors. "Well, my impression at this time is that theres not been shown premeditation or planning in the, in the alleged slaying. That what we have at the very best is second-degree murder."

"I think that the second count should remain as it is; felony firearm," Freeman added. "I think that second-degree murder is an appropriate charge as to the defendants. Okay."

The next day Vincent took the stand and said he shot the gun because members of a rival gang provoked him.

On Oct. 6, 1991, Vincent shot a .22 caliber long rifle in the air twice because "he felt his life had been threatened." He testified that members of the "Folks Down" gang threatened to fight him earlier that day.

Vincent said he drove to Hamady High School and saw several men from "Folks Up" and "Folks Down" groups arguing in the parking lot. He testified to shooting the gun out of the car hatch after hearing two shots fired.

After Vincents testimony, two days following his original statements, Freeman changed his decision.

"I've decided to let the jury make its own determination on the degrees," Freeman said. "That's where well stand now so well let them, all those issues submitted with to them, first, second, manslaughter and you can go on from there."

The jury found Vincent guilty of first-degree murder, which mandates under Michigan law a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole.

Vincent's counsel appealed, claiming violations of the double jeopardy clause, a constitutional protection that prohibits trying the same person for the same crime twice.

The Michigan Court of Appeals agreed that Vincent had received an unfair trial and that Freeman had acquitted him on the charge of first-degree murder and essentially retried him for the same crime twice. The panel replaced Vincents first-degree murder conviction with a second-degree murder conviction and ordered that he be re-sentenced.

The prosecution appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, which reversed by a 4 to 3 vote. The majority found that Freeman's statements did not constitute an acquittal of first-degree murder and the court required written evidence of the directed verdict.

In fact, a written docket entry dated March 31, 1992, indicates that Freeman did grant the defendants motion to dismiss charges of first-degree murder.

Almost six years following the controversial acquittal, Vincent filed a habeas corpus appeal to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging that he was being held in prison unfairly.

The federal court agreed and stated that Freeman's comments were enough to acquit Vincent on charges of first-degree murder. Further, the court found that the continuation of Vincent's trial put him in double jeopardy.

Before the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals, prosecutors argued that under Michigan law, the trial judges statement do not constitute an acquittal and that the federal courts should not intervene.

Further, the prosecution claimed that trial judges can change their decision on a motion without violating the double-jeopardy clause.

The 6th Circuit panel unanimously affirmed.

"When the trial judge granted the motion for directed verdict...his actions constituted a grant of an acquittal," wrote Judge Joseph Hood. "We further find that he was not entitled to reverse that decision later in the trial."

Hood added that the opinion of Michigans Supreme Court was not binding.

"We are not bound by the holding of the Michigan Supreme Court," Hood wrote. "Instead, we must examine the state trial judges comments to determine whether he made a ruling which resolved the factual elements of the first-degree murder charge."

Does Michigan Supreme Court's conclusion that the trial court did not acquit Vincent of first-degree murder classify as a fact? Was Vincent placed in double jeopardy when the trial judge initially acquitted him on the charge of first-degree murder, and shortly thereafter changed the decision although both decisions were made away from the jury?

Although the first question is less significant than the later, the case could have widespread implications, according to David A. Moran, a special assistant defender who is representing Vincent pro-bono.

"If a judge is allowed to do what this judge did, the defense is put in an impossible position," Moran said.

Moran argued that the defense planned its strategy assuming the highest charge Vincent faced was second-degree murder and tried to reduce the charges further to voluntary manslaughter.

He said the defenses strategy probably would have been different and Vincent may not have testified had the defense thought Vincent still faced a first-degree murder charge.

"By admitting he was provoked he basically admits he had time to think about it," Moran said in a phone interview.

He added that the defense should be able to plan its strategy and "go about their business secure in the knowledge that they have been acquitted of a charge."

Moran also said that the 1986 Supreme Court's opinion in Smalis v. Pennsylvania clearly states that continuing trial activities after a defendant has been acquitted, either by trial or by bench, violates the double jeopardy clause.

In Smalis, a trial judge sustained a demurrer, which is equivalent to a directed verdict, acquitting a husband and wife charged with various crimes in connection with a fire in the building they owned that resulted in the killing of two tenants. The U.S Supreme Court said the prosecutions appeal of a directed verdict-acquittal before the conclusion of a criminal case violated the double jeopardy clause.

On Jan. 10, 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted the case for review, and allowed Vincent to have his case heard without costs.

On May 19, 2003, the Court reversed, holding unanimously that the judge's comments were not sufficiently final to trigger Vincent's double jeopardy claim.

In writing the Court's opinion, Chief Justice William Rehnquist criticized the 6th Circuit for superimposing its decision onto the state courts' own conclusions on whether double jeopardy applied.