U.S. v. Arvizu, Ralph (01/15/2002)
U.S. v. Arvizu, Ralph (01/15/2002)
Questions presented: (1) Whether the court of appeals erroneously departed from the totality-of-the-circumstances test that governs reasonable-suspicion determinations under the 4th Amendment by holding that seven facts observed by a law enforcement officer were entitled to no weight and could not be considered as a matter of law. (2) Whether, under the totality-of-the-circumstances test, the Border Patrol agent in this case had reasonable suspicion that justified a stop of a vehicle near the Mexican border.
BY LISA SMITH, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE
Around 2 p.m., Jan. 19, 1998, U.S. Border Patrol Agent Clinton Stoddard was alerted that a minivan was heading north along Leslie Canyon Road, a mostly unpaved road near the small community of Douglas, Ariz.
Drivers smuggling illegal immigrants, Stoddard knew, sometimes used the unpaved roads to bypass the border station 30 miles north of the U.S.-Mexico border. Many of these smugglers drive minivans.
Within the hour, Stoddard knew border officers were to change shifts, an opportunity smugglers use to slip north undetected. Stoddard also knew that a month earlier, another officer had found marijuana in a minivan heading north on the same road.
Stoddard spotted the minivan, which contained Ralph Arvizu, his sister, and her three children. The van slowed, Stoddard said, and the driver, Arvizu, didnt acknowledge him. Stoddard also noticed the knees of the children in the backseat were raised as if their feet were resting on something. As he followed the van, the children inside began waving to him, but did not turn around.
Stoddard stopped the van and asked Arvizu if he could look around. Arvizu agreed. Stoddard walked around the van and opened the vans sliding door. Inside, under the childrens feet, he found a black duffel bag containing marijuana.
At an evidence suppression hearing prior to trial on charges of possession with intent to distribute marijuana, Arvizu's attorney argued that Stoddard violated his 4th Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure because he did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the minivan, and that Arvizu did not give voluntary consent to the search.
The federal judge rejected both arguments and denied the motion to suppress. Arvizu then entered a conditional guilty plea, so he could appeal.
On July 7, 2000, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed unanimously with Arvizu, finding that because the stop and the ensuing search were illegal, the marijuana entered into evidence was inadmissible.
The opinion, authored by Judge Stephen Reinhardt and amended five months later, analyzed each of the factors Stoddard took into account when stopping Arvizu and determined that none were sufficient to show reasonable suspicion. "What factors law enforcement officers may consider in deciding to stop and question citizens minding their own business should, if possible, be carefully circumscribed and clearly articulated," Reinhardt wrote.
The district court had "improperly relied" on seven factors that were "neither relevant nor appropriate to a reasonable suspicion analysis." First, Reinhardt wrote in the opinion, "slowing down after spotting a law enforcement vehicle," as Arvizu did when he saw Stoddard, "is an entirely normal response that is in no way indicative of criminal activity." Second, nor was Arvizus failure to acknowledge Stoddard. Third, nor was the childrens behavior. Fourth, just because a minivan stopped recently on the same road contained marijuana doesnt taint all minivans driving in that area. Fifth, the court said it was "hardly surprising" Stoddard did not recognize it because the roads are trafficked by tourists heading to the nearby national forest or national monument. Sixth, the address under which the van was registered, an area Stoddard said was "notorious" for drug and alien smuggling, also cannot be considered because "ones place of residence is simply not relevant to a determination of reasonable suspicion," Reinhardt wrote. And, finally, given the fact that the childrens knees were raised, it is more logical to assume they were resting their feet on a suitcase or cooler rather than on drugs.
Because the stop was illegal, the evidence Stoddard obtained during the search of Arvizus vehicle should have been inadmissible. "This is a classic case of obtaining evidence through the exploitation of an illegal stop," Reinhardt wrote, in reversing the trial judges order denying Arvizus suppression motion.
In seeking review by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Solicitor Generals office argued that "the court of appeals has created a direct conflict with decisions of [the Supreme Court] and other courts of appeals, incorrectly excluded critical evidence in this case, and undermined effective law enforcement in the Ninth Circuit."
On June 4, 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case and allowed Arvizu to proceed in forma pauperis.
Victoria A. Brambl, Arvizus attorney, said she will be arguing that the 9th Circuit ruled correctly by looking at the factors and determining what weight they had on determining reasonable suspicion. Reversing the appeals court, Brambl said, would give law enforcement too much power.
"Police would have, in essence, what would be unbridled discretion," she said. "They would be able to stop anybody they want. Reasonable suspicion limits what they can do."
On Jan. 15, 2002, a unanimous Court held that in considering the totality of the circumstances, the border patrols in Arizona acted lawfully in stopping the minivan.
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice William Rehnquist noted that because the "balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security" tilts in favor of a standard less than probable cause in brief investigatory stops, the 4th Amendment is satisfied if the officer's action is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity may be afoot.
That process, Rehnquist wrote allows officers to draw on their own experiences and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the situation before them.
In this case, the Court concluded, it was reasonable for Stoddard to infer from observations, from the vehicle registration check, and from his experience that Arvizu had set out on a route used by drug smugglers, intending to pass through the area during a border patrol shift change.
Relevant Links
- http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/00-1519.ZS.html
- http://docket.medill.northwestern.edu/archives/000047.php
- http://docket.medill.northwestern.edu/archives/000048.php
- http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=9th&navby=case&no=9910229v2&exact=1
- http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2000/2pet/7pet/2000-1519.pet.aa.html
- http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2000/2pet/7pet/2000-1519.pet.rep.html
