Carey, Tom (warden) v. Saffold, Tony Eugene (06/17/2002)

By: Megan Reichgott, Medill News Service

Questions presented

Does the time during which a habeas corpus petitioner failed to properly pursue his state collateral remedies fall within the meaning of ""pending"" set forth by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's provision, which tolls the running of the statutory limitations period?

Brief

In 1990, Tony Eugene Saffold was convicted in a California state court of murder, assault with a firearm and two counts of robbery, in connection with the 1986 death of Stockton restaurant owner Augustin Michel, who was shot in the neck during a robbery attempt. Saffold appealed, and his conviction became final on April 20, 1992.

Now Saffold is at the center of a tug of war between Congress and civil liberties groups over the writ of habeas corpus. At issue is whether Saffold filed his petition for the writ on time.

The writ of habeas corpus commands the government to ""produce the body"" of a prisoner and show to a neutral party that the incarceration or sentence is lawful. A prisoner files the writ once all state and lower court appeals are exhausted.

Five years ago, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The act created a year-long statute of limitations for state prisoners filing a federal petition of habeas corpus. The year begins immediately after a conviction becomes final. For prisoners like Saffold, whose conviction became final before passage of the AEDPA, the clock began ticking on the acts effective date, April 24, 1996.

Therefore, Saffold had until April 23, 1997, to file the writ, unless the time was ""tolled,"" or paused. The AEDPAs tolling provision states, ""[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral reviewÉis pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation.""

Saffold filed his state habeas application in the Superior Court of San Joaquin County on April 17, 1997, six days short of the filing deadline.

The superior court denied Saffolds state habeas petition on June 9, 1997. Six days later, Saffold filed his petition with the California Court of Appeal. The petition was denied on June 26, 1997.

Saffold then waited over four months to file an original federal petition of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, on Nov. 13, 1997.

Saffolds attorney, Mary McComb, said the delay was caused in part because Saffold was unaware of the California Court of Appeals decision to deny the state petition.

""He acted as quickly as he could,"" McComb said.

Six months later, on May 27, 1998, the court denied the federal petition, ""on the merits and for lack of diligence."" The court said the statute should be tolled ""only while each state court had the petition under consideration."" According to the courts measurements, Saffold ran over the one-year deadline by almost five months.

On July 17, 2000, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that the district court should have tolled time ""for the entire period during which Saffold pursued state habeas relief,"" because the California Supreme Court did address the merits of Saffolds claim. The 9th Circuit used a previous decision by the 9th Circuit, in Nino v. Galaza, as a basis for the decision.

Judge Diarmuid OScannlain dissented, arguing, ""In a case involving such dilatory behavior as this, the tripartite process cannot be treated as one solid block of tolled time; rather, the clock must continue to run in the periods of excessive delay between the three separate habeas petitions.""

Additionally, the 9th Circuit decided the ""mailbox"" rule for pro se prisoners (when a prisoner delivers legal papers to prison authorities for transmission to court) applies to Saffold's case. Whether and when Saffold delivered his petitions to prison authorities is still unresolved.

On Oct. 15, 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case, and allowed Saffold to proceed in forma pauperis.

On one side are those who say the AEDPA was correct in setting a time limit to file a writ and that prisoners already get too many appeals, weighing down the court system.

On the other side are groups like the American Civil Liberties Union, arguing that any attempts to limit the writ are unconstitutional. In 1996, ACLU President Nadine Strossen and Executive Director Ira Glasser sent a letter to President Clinton asking him to veto the AEDPA.

They wrote, ""The Great Writ must endure, if we are to endure as a free nation.""

On June 17, 2002, the Court, split along ideological lines, found 5-4 for Saffold. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote the opinion for the majority. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the dissent for himself, Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, and Chief Justice William Rehnquist.

Though the majority conceded that the words ""on the merits"" by themselves do not indicate that Saffold's petition was timely, they declined to conclude that the 9th Circuit was wrong in its conclusion. The majority had the case remanded to the 9th Circuit to reconsider the timeliness issue, with instructions to evaluate any special conditions justifying Saffold's delay in filing in the state court and any other relevant considerations.

In so holding, the Court rejected a uniform national rule that a state petition is not ""pending"" during the interval between a lower court's entry of judgment and the timely filing of a notice of appeal in the next court.

The dissenters criticized the majority for addressing a question not presented, ""whether the statute of limitations would have been tolled for a hypothetical prisoner who filed an appeal somewhere else.""

That left the majority going off in a direction, Kennedy wrote, that ""will disrupt the sound operation of the federal limitations period in at least 36 States. This is what happens when the Court departs from the text of a nationwide statute to reach a result in one particular State.""