Williams, Terry v. Taylor, John, Warden (04/18/2000)

By: Kristi King, Medill News Service

Questions presented

(1) Did Williams show that, absent the trial counsels deficient performance, all twelve jurors would have voted for life imprisonment instead of imposing the death penalty, even where state law would have mandated a life sentence if only one juror had voted for life imprisonment? (2) Is a state courts decision to deny a federal constitutional claim ""contrary to"" clearly established federal law only if it is in ""square conflict"" with a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court? (3) Did the appellate court err by improperly limiting the responsibility of federal courts to decide questions of federal constitutional law?

Brief

On Nov. 3, 1985, just before 2 a.m., Harris Thomas Stone was found dead in his bed. Police investigating the scene found no sign of a struggle but noticed that the elderly Danville, Va., resident's wallet was missing. An initial medical examination concluded Stone had died of alcohol poisoning.

Almost six months later, an inmate at a local jail confessed to murdering Stone in an anonymous letter to the Danville police chief. Following several interviews, Terry Williams, in jail for theft, confessed multiple times to the murder and robbery.

Williams said he hit Stone on the chest and back with a mattock, a tool used for digging up tree stumps, and took $3 from the elderly man's wallet. When Stone's body was exhumed, an additional autopsy revealed he died from a punctured lung caused by broken ribs, consistent with being beaten with an object.

In September 1986, Williams was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Almost a year later, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed.

Williams filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Danville Circuit Court in 1988, claiming, among other things, the inefficiency of his trial counsel.

Almost seven years later, Williams, then represented by attorneys from the firm of ODonoghue and ODonoghue in Washington, D.C., who volunteered to represent Williams under the American Bar Associations Postconviction Death Penalty Representation Project, filed an amended petition.

That petition provided striking evidence that Williams original attorneys had failed to show crucial evidence of Williams extremely deprived and abused upbringing. According to court documents, Williams was routinely beaten and neglected by his parents. To avoid beatings, Williams, who is borderline mentally retarded, would spend the night outside hiding under boxes.

The attorneys also failed to show that he functions ""very well"" in the juvenile correction centers and other structure environments where he was placed. In fact, Williams has been commended several times by officials for his model behavior.

Testimony from Williams wife, Jenny Lee, and his 11-year-old daughter, Jennie was also ignored by the attorneys. Additionally, the petition showed that Williams lead counsel, E.L. Motley, Jr., suffered from debilitating mental illness. He was later banned from practicing law.

Although the petition was filed in Danville Circuit Court, jurisdiction was immediately transferred to the Virginia Supreme Court which ordered the Circuit Court to report its findings and conclusions based on the ineffective counsel claim. In his report, the same judge who had previously found Williams sentence ""just"" and ""appropriate,"" determined that the behavior of Williams original counsel during the sentencing phase was ineffective and could have been ""critical to the jurys decision as to Williams punishment."" However, the Virginia Supreme Court rejected the petition in June 1997.

Later, Williams petitioned for federal habeas relief. The U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia granted the writ on grounds of ineffective counsel. On appeal, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals sided with the Virginia Supreme Court, concluding that Williams counsel erred in not introducing relevant evidence, but found that the evidence would not have changed the outcome of the trial.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 stipulates that habeas relief be granted only when the state courts decision to grant relief is based on a relevant Supreme Court ruling in a way that would be unreasonable. Though Williams argued that the Virginia Supreme Court misconstrued that statute, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Williams sentence.

Although the appeals court determined that Williams' counsel had erred in not introducing relevant evidence, it determined that evidence would not have changed the outcome of the trial. The appeals court insisted evidence of Williams' crime spree following Stone's murder would have convinced the jury that he was a threat to society.

According to court documents, in the months following Stone's murder, Williams savagely beat an elderly woman, stole two cars, set fire to a home, stabbed a man during a robbery, set fire to the jail and confessed to urges to choke fellow inmates and break their jaws. The court contended that, given this evidence, testimony of Williams' relatives would not have changed the jury's verdict.

The 4th Circuit panel sided with Virginia, determining that one hypothetical juror was not enough to warrant relief. The appeals court also determined that Motley never acted in a way during Williams' trial that would have compromised the outcome.

On Apr. 5, 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, limited review to the questions presented above, allowed Williams to proceed in forma paupereis and stayed his execution. Williams was scheduled to be executed on Apr. 7, 1999.

On April 18, 2000, the Court threw out Williams' death sentence, yet made it harder for state prisoners to gain federal habeas review.

The paradoxical conclusions stemmed from a 6-3 opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens in Williams' favor, and a 5-4 opinion written by Justice Sandra Day O' Connor on the limits of federal habeas jurisdiction.

The Stevens opinion concluded that Williams was denied effective assistanceof counsel when his trial lawyers failed to investigate and to present substantial mitigating evidence to the sentencing jury.

In Justice O' Connor's opinion, the shifting majority held that the federal courts may intercede only if a state court ""arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached"" by the U.S. Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Court's decisions but ""unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.""

The majority teased out the meaning of ""unreasonable"" by saying that although it is difficult to define, the Court intends it to mean that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.