Wright, Ceasar v. Universal Maritime Service (11/16/1998)

By: Chandra Palermo, Medill News Service

Questions presented

Was the court below correct in holding -- contrary to this court's decisions in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. and other cases, particularly Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Co. and McDonald v. City of West Branch -- that a general arbitration clause in a collective bargaining contract bars an employee covered by the contract from filing his own lawsuit under a federal anti-discrimination statute?

Brief

Ceasar Wright, a longshoreman in Charleston, S.C., fell off a freight container at work, injuring his foot and back, on Feb. 18, 1992. He accepted a $250,000 worker's compensation settlement from his employer, Stevens Shipping Company.

On Jan. 2, 1995, Wright went to the hiring hall of his union, the Local 1422 of the International Longshoreman's Association, and said he was ready and able to work again. He had a note from his physician supporting his claim.

Wright was referred to and worked for four stevedoring contractors over the next ten days. Once the companies found out about Wright's previous settlement, which they say was for total and permanent disability, they informed the union that Wright would no longer be accepted for employment referral. Their multi-employer collective bargaining representative, the South Carolina Stevedores Association, claimed that the collective bargaining agreement it entered into with Wright's union holds that Wright's total and permanent disability makes him unqualified to work.

Wright claims he was never actually certified as permanently disabled. But rather than filing a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement's arbitration procedure, his union advised him to file suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act against the association and the individual employers who refused to hire him.

Shortly after Wright sued the association and six of its members, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, that individual discrimination cases are barred by union grievance and arbitration procedures.

The district court dismissed Wright's lawsuit under Austin, and the 4th Circuit upheld the ruling on appeal.

The appeals court found that the arbitration clause in the agreement in question states that the ""Union agrees that this Agreement is intended to cover all matters affecting wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."" Wright's attorney, Ray P. McClain, said that language was not actually used in the arbitration clause.

""The arbitration clause doesn't say what it covers,"" he said. He argued that since the clause does not specifically mention ADA claims, Wright's case should not be barred.

The appeals court admitted that the clause was broad and concluded that ""An employer need not provide a laundry list of potential disputes in order for them to be covered by an arbitration clause.""

Wright claimed that the 4th Circuit opinion conflicts with the Supreme Court's 1974 ruling in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, which held that a union's arbitration agreement does not bar an employee from suing his employer for racial bias under the Civil Rights Act.

Wright's petition for certiorari was granted by the U.S. Supreme Court on March 2, 1998.

In a unanimous decision on Nov. 16, the Court sided with Wright, holding that a general arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement does not prevent a worker from bringing a discrimination suit against an employer. Writing for the Court, Justice Antonin Scalia said the collective bargaining agreement's general arbitration clause does not require Wright to use the arbitration procedure for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act. ""We hold that the collective bargaining agreement in this case does not contain a clear and unmistakable waiver of the covered employees' rights to a judicial forum for federal claims of employment discrimination,"" Scalia wrote.