Jinks, Susan v. Richland County, SC (04/22/2003)

Questions presented: Whether the tolling provision of the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. 1367(d), invades state sovereignty in violation of the U.S. Constitution's 10th Amendment and its Necessary and Proper Clause.

BY REKA BALA, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE

When Carl Jinks was arrested in October 1994, he was drunk. Jinks was charged with not paying $1,500 in child support for his two daughters from his first marriage. He was held at a Richland County Detention Center in South Carolina soon after his arrest.

But four days later, Jinks was dead.

The detention center had been informed that Jinks was suffering from alcohol withdrawal, which was later confirmed by the centers physician, Dr. Charles Eskridge. Eskridge wrote a prescription for Jinks to help him detoxify and ordered that it be given to Jinks twice a day, especially since Alcohol Withdrawal Syndrome can turn fatal 72 to 96 hours from the last drink.

The detention center never administered the prescription, and never thoroughly supervised Jinks while he was in its care.

Jinks second wife, Susan, claimed the jail did not properly treat her husband's condition. She decided to take action against the county and its physician.

South Carolina law requires in its statute of limitations that people bring action to court within two years from the original date the incident occurred. The main purpose of this statute is to prevent any witnesses from losing memory of an incident. The South Carolina Tort Claims Act also allows citizens to sue a governmental unit in the state either in federal court or in state court.

In 1996, Susan Jinks chose to sue in federal court for the wrongful death of her husband, and she did so just under the two-year deadline. Jinks had two separate claims: she had a federal claim, which the court called "deliberate indifference," or that the jail deliberately did not adopt procedures protecting Carl Jinks's civil rights. Jinks was also suing under state claims stating the jail had recklessly disregarded her husband's well-being.

In November 1997, the district court granted Richland County's motion for summary judgment and shortly thereafter it also declined to hear the state claims, dismissing them without prejudice, which meant that if Jinks wanted to bring her claim back to federal court at a later date, the court would hear it. The federal court dismissed Jinks's claims because it preferred that all state claims be heard in state court.

On Dec. 18, sixteen days after the federal judge issued that dismissal order, Jinks filed the wrongful death claim and survival action in state court in South Carolina.

Normally when a suit switches from federal to state court, it is considered a brand new claim, notwithstanding the suit being filed previously in another court. In 1990, Congress enacted a federal supplemental jurisdiction statute to combat this problem. This tolling provision granted a 30-day window for all parties whose suits were still pending in federal court, so that when they are re-filed in state court, the two-year statute of limitations still prevails.

As the case was pending in state court, Jinks appealed the federal dismissal to the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals in South Carolina, which later affirmed.

In state court, however, a Richland County circuit court judge allowed the suit to proceed. After trial, a jury returned with a verdict, ruling in favor of Jinks and granted her $80,000 to be shared with Carl's two daughters from his first marriage.

According to a federal tolling provision, Jinks filed her suit in state court in the right amount of time. But the detention center, Richland County, argued that Jinks failed to bring the state court action within the two-year statute of limitations, therefore she had no right to proceed with her case.

Richland County appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court, arguing that the federal tolling provision violated the states sovereignty rule, and saying that Congress should not have the right to extend the time limit or dictate what a state can do with its own laws. Richland County also argued that the tolling provision violated the 10th Amendment.

The 10th Amendment preserves state rights against interference with the federal government. It states that whatever rulings are beyond federal power should be reserved to the states.

In April 2002, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding in favor of Richland County that the tolling provision violated the 10th Amendment and was unconstitutional.

"County claims [the tolling provision] infringes on South Carolina's sovereign immunity by the length of time in which a person may sue a political subdivision of the State on grounds of negligence. We agree with County," Justice E.C. Burnett wrote in the opinion.

"Since her complaint was not filed within the two year statute of limitations provided by the Tort Claims Act, her negligence claim against County is barred as untimely. The trial judge erred in holding otherwise."

The South Carolina Supreme Court ruled said that since the statute of limitations was a matter of state sovereignty, the federal government did not have any authority to change this law for the state.

It also cited the recent Supreme Court opinion in Raygor v. University of Minnesota, which held that, due to the 11th Amendment, federal supplemental jurisdiction does not extend the time-limit for state law claims that are dismissed.

The 11th Amendment bars suit in federal court against a state by residents of that state.

The South Carolina Supreme Court also concluded that the U.S. Constitutions Necessary and Proper Clause, or the Sweeping Clause, was also violated. This clause states that a law cannot be "proper" if it violates the principles of state sovereignty. Richland County maintained that the tolling provision was not "necessary" to federal procedures and was not "proper" because it abrogated the statute of limitations.

"Congress exceeded its constitutional authority in enacting [the 30-day window] to the extent it interferes with the States sovereignty," Justice Burnett wrote.

On Oct. 21, 2002 the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case.

"You have a right of access to the courts ... state laws cannot discriminate in that right," said Jinks's lawyer Robert Peck. "The statute of limitations purpose was served as soon as she filed in federal court."

The Court is being asked to decide if Congress has the authority to enact a 30-day window provision.

In the 1944 Supreme Court case, Yakus v. U.S., Peck said the Court ruled that once parties have filed in any court, they have satisfied the statute of limitations.

Jinks's lawyers also said that since the Raygor decision only dealt with the 11th Amendment issue, the South Carolina Supreme Courts ruling does not apply to Jinks. She sued a county, not a state, so Richland County has a weak argument, they said.

"If [the Court] agrees with me, then this case is over and Susan gets to collect her jury verdict," Peck said.

On April 22, 2003, the Court unanimously reversed, holding that the federal statute requiring that a state statute of limitations be tolled for the period during which a cause of action had previously been pending in federal court, does not exceed Congress's enumerated powers and is constitutional as applied to claims brought against a state's political subdivisions.

In writing the opinion for the Court, Justice Antonin Scalia concluded thatthe federal law was necessary, in that it is conducive to theadministration of justice in federal court and is plainly adapted to that end, and it is proper in that it doesn't violate state-sovereignty principles by regulating state-court procedures.

Justice David Souter added a concurrence.