Johnson, Robert v. U.S. (04/04/2005)
Question presented: When a federal court bases an enhanced sentence on a vacated state conviction, is the elimination of the state conviction a "fact" supporting a prisoner's 28 U.S.C. sec. 2255 claim requiring reduction of the prisoner's sentence?
BY DIMEKA NICHOLS, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE
By the time undercover officers in the small farming town of Lenox, Georgia, decided to arrest Robert Johnson Jr., he had unknowingly sold cocaine to them on six occasions between 1993 and 1994, including several transactions while Johnson was in county jail on weekend furloughs.
Following his arrest, Johnson and five co-defendants faced a 19-count indictment that included federal drug conspiracy charges.
Prosecutors offered Johnson a deal—if he pleaded guilty to a single count of distribution, the remaining charges against him would be dropped. Johnson agreed.
During the sentencing phase, a presentencing investigation board determined that under U.S. sentencing guidelines, Johnson qualified as a "career offender."
The determination was based on Johnson's criminal history. He had been convicted twice before on state drug charges—a July 1989 conviction for distribution of cocaine and a November 1989 conviction for the sale of cocaine.
Johnson filed an objection to being classified as a career offender but the objection was later withdrawn by his attorney during a sentencing hearing.
The career offender classification proved to be detrimental. Had Johnson not been placed in this category, he could have received as little as nine years in prison. Instead, on November 18, 1994, eight months to the day after his indictment, Johnson was sentenced to 15 years and 8 months—the maximum imprisonment for his sentencing range.
After sentencing, Johnson appealed to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals. Johnson sought to nullify his sentence on the grounds that his state convictions in 1989 were obtained in violation of his constitutional right to counsel.
Johnson argued that since the state convictions were invalid, the enhanced federal sentence he received as a result of his "career offender" status should be adjusted accordingly.
The 11th Circuit affirmed, but issued an important caveat in passing:"Should the appellant obtain at some future date the vacation of the state court convictions[s] in question because they were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, he could petition the district court under 28 U.S.C. "2255…"
Section 2255 of Title 28 of the U.S. Code provides that a prisoner in custody for federal crime may petition the court that imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence. Petitions are subject to a one-year statute of limitations which runs from the latest of four conditions including: the date on which "the facts" supporting the claim presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
Following the 11th Circuit decision, Johnson petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court and was denied certiorari in April 1996.
Just over a year later, Johnson returned to the district court on a motion to extend the one-year time limit allowed to file a "2255 petition. The court held Johnson's motion was untimely.
In February 1998, Johnson employed a new strategy. He challenged his 1989 state convictions, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated when he plead guilty during those proceedings.
In 2000, the Superior Court of Wayne County, Georgia, ruled in Johnson's favor, declaring Johnson's prior state convictions declaring that his guilty pleas were unconstitutionally obtained.
Four months later, on Feb. 13, 2001, Johnson filed another "2255 motion in federal court. This time, he was armed with the state court's vacation of his prior convictions. Since Johnson no longer qualified as a career offender, he asked the court to re-sentence him, minus the seven-year enhancement.
The court denied the petition, ruling that Johnson had filed years too late.
Two years later, the 11th Circuit affirmed in a split panel decision.
"We conclude that the [nullification of Johnson's] prior state convictions is not a "fact" from which the one-year statute of limitations may run," wrote Chief Judge Susan H. Black for the majority.
The court relied heavily on Brackett v. U.S., a 1st Circuit decision from 2001 which held that setting aside a prior state conviction is not a "fact" within the meaning of 28 U.S "2255.
Further, the court held, Johnson did not show that his untimely filing resulted from circumstances beyond his control. According to the court, Johnson's "2255 petition should have been filed one year from the date his sentence became final.
"I think a decision of a state court reversing a state criminal conviction is a "fact" within the meaning of 28 U.S. "2255," argued Judge Paul H. Roney in his dissent.
Roney cited U.S. v. Gadsen, a more recent 4th Circuit decision, holding that "the federal statute of limitations begins running when the state court conviction is conclusively invalidated."
In an amicus brief to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers urged the Court to rule in favor of Johnson, arguing that the 11th Circuit ruling sets a precedent for federal prisoners to receive enhanced, possibly life sentences, based on invalid state convictions.
On Sept. 28, 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted review in the case, and on April 4, 2005, a divided Court affirmed, holding 5-4 that in cases such as Johnson's in which an inmate collaterally attacked his federal sentence on the ground that a state conviction used to enhance that sentence has since been vacated, "2255's 1-year limitations period begins to run when the inmate receives notice of the order vacating the prior conviction.
Justice David Souter wrote the Court's majority opinion. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the dissent for himself, Justice John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.