Muhammad, Shakur v. Close, Mark

Questions presented: (1) Whether a plaintiff who wishes to bring a Sec. 1983 suit challenging only the conditions, rather than the fact or duration, of his confinement, must satisfy the favorable termination requirement of Heck v. Humphrey? (2) Whether a prison inmate who has been, but is no longer, in administrative segregation may bring a Sec. 1983 suit challenging the conditions of his confinement (i.e. his prior placement in administrative segregation) without first satisfying the favorable termination requirement of Heck v. Humphrey?

BY: HILLARY RHODES, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE

It was breakfast time on May 21, 1997, at the Standish Maximum Facility, in Standish, Michigan. One inmate, Shakur Muhammad, was among many sitting down to eat, in the glass-enclosed chow hall.

He looked up through the glass and made eye contact with a prison guard in the hallway. It was the same guard whom Muhammad had sued twice before for threatening behavior.

What happened next in the chow hall differs according to whos telling the story. A confrontation ensued, and it ended with two officers handcuffing Muhammad and taking him to a detention cell.

According to Muhammad, the guard had "made a fighting stance and walked quickly toward him with his face contorted." He came over to Muhammads table and said, "What's up?" at which point Muhammad was led away by two other officers.

But according to the prison guard, Mark Close, it was Muhammads face that was contorted, "with veins bulging at his temples."

Close said he noticed Muhammad staring at him through the glass as if he had something to say. Close stepped inside the chow hall to hear him better. Then Muhammed "angrily walked toward me and looked very hostile," said Close.

He said Muhammad stood face-to-face with him until the other officers took Muhammad away.

Close filed a major misconduct report against Muhammad later that day, charging him with threatening behavior. That charge required Muhammad to be held in detention for six days before a hearing officer reviewed the two sides of the story.

Based on his investigation, which involved listening to the other officers and inmates who had witnessed the incident, the hearing officer reduced the charge against Muhammad to insolence.

Still a punishable violation, an insolence charge does not require the pre-hearing detention that Muhammad served for six days.

Muhammad was punished with seven additional days of detention. He also lost all privileges for the next 30, meaning he couldnt watch television, listen to the radio, go to the game room, the library, the prison store, or out to the yard. And he was ineligible that month to receive any good-time credits, which are typically awarded monthly.

Muhammad said that he was "framed" and that Closes actions were retaliatory. He said that Close filed a more serious charge against Muhammad than he should have, to get back at him for the previous lawsuits and grievances Muhammad had filed against Close.

Muhammad did not seek a rehearing or judicial review to get his misconduct charge overturned.

He said, "I have done rehearings and judicial review of major misconducts, maybe ten, twelve tickets. And Im convinced that that whole system doesnt work."

Instead, Muhammad filed a section 1983 civil rights suit against Close, demanding a total of $9,300 in damages, and the expungement of the misconduct charge.

Section 1983 originated as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and was designed to provide a federal remedy for infringements upon civil rights that were not being protected adequately by the state authorities.

It states: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, customÉsubjects [any] other personÉto the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable..."

Close moved to dismiss the case, claiming in part that the 1997 Supreme Court decision in Edwards v. Balisok precluded a Section 1983 case from going forward whenever the validity of any punishment imposed at a disciplinary hearing was called into question.

The Court ruled in that case that the plaintiff should first fulfill the "favorable termination requirement" of the habeas corpus statute, said Close. That is when a prison inmates sentence or conviction is rendered invalid, reversed, or called into question by a state or federal court or an executive order before the inmate may collect damages in a Section 1983 suit.

It dates back to the 1994 decision in Heck v Humphrey and is meant to avoid Section 1983 actions that might swallow up the more specific provisions of the federal habeas corpus statute.

Both the federal magistrate and the district judge denied Close's motion.

Those judges said Muhammad could not and needed not bring a habeas corpus action.

They said the favorable termination requirement did not apply in this situation because Muhammad was essentially contesting the six days of pre-hearing detention, which he had already served, and was not disputing his insolence charge, but rather the conditions under which he was issued a misconduct ticket in the first place.

This time Close moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Muhammad, who was acting as his own attorney, failed to produce enough evidence to prove his claim of retaliatory action.

This time Close's motion was granted and the case was dismissed.

Muhammad appealed, again represented himself, to the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals.

The 6th Circuit affirmed, but cited a recent opinion in Huey v. Stine, in which the 6th Circuit held that a prisoner's Section 1983 suit against prison officials was barred by the favorable termination requirement.

In an unpublished opinion, the 6th Circuit held that because Muhammad requested the expungement of his misconduct charge, a section 1983 action was precluded where the relief sought would require the court to "unwind the judgment of the state agency."

This notion poses a disturbing threat to the constitutional rights of inmates, said Muhammad, who is now represented by Washington, D.C. attorney Corinne Beckwith.

"Prison guards and officials who control nearly every facet of inmates lives, and who at times violate the constitutional rights of those inmates, epitomize the type of defendant contemplated by [Section] 1983," Muhammad said.

He said there needs to be a limit on the scope of Section 1983 suits, but that it can be accomplished by drawing a line between suits challenging the fact or duration of a prisoners confinement and those challenging the conditions of a persons confinement.

In this case, Muhammad claimed, his amended suit challenges merely the conditions of his confinement and should therefore be able to immediately pursue a Section 1983 suit without fulfilling the favorable termination requirement.

Close, represented by Michigans Attorney General Michael A. Cox, doesnt agree. He characterizes Muhammads withdraw of his expungement request as hypocritical.

Muhammad originally pleaded not guilty to the insolence charge and now is reversing that, "in an effort to avoid the favorable termination requirement," Close said.

Close said Muhammad views his 6-day pre-hearing detention in "artificial isolation" from the rest of his misconduct punishment when in reality, "this lawsuit is a collateral attack on [Muhammad's] misconduct conviction."

He said: "If the nature of a [Section] 1983 claim is such that it necessarily implies the invalidity of the misconduct proceeding, the favorable termination requirement applies, whether the challenge is to the duration of confinement or the conditions of confinement."

On June 16, 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted review in the case and limited its review to whether a prisoner wanting to challenge the conditions of his confinement must satisfy the favorable termination requirement before bringing a Section 1983 suit, and whether this applies to a prison inmate who is no longer in the confinement whose conditions he is challenging.

Requiring people filing Section 1983 claims like Muhammads to first satisfy the favorable termination requirement might have "the curious result of precluding many classic civil rights plaintiffs from getting into federal court," Muhammad said.

He uses the example of an inmate who has been placed in detention solely because the hearing officer was discriminating against him on the basis of race. Such an inmate might find himself without a method of action if a Section 1983 suit is not immediately at his disposal.

Meanwhile Close said this case has reached the highest court "all because an inmate asserts that a prison guard had a grudge against him and he received six days in detention."

"The lofty purposes of the Civil Rights Act should not be trivialized in this manner," according to Close.

On Feb. 25, 2004, the Court reversed, in a unanimous per curiam opinion, holding that the rule in Heck v. Humphrey, requiring prisoners to resort to state litigation and federal habeas before filing a section 1983 civil rights suit , is not applicable.