Stogner, Mario v. California (06/26/2003)
Questions presented: (1) Did the California legislature's abolition of the statute of limitations requirement, which historically comprised an element of the crimes charged, so as to charge Stogner retroactively, violate the Ex Post Facto Clause? (2) Did the California legislature's abolition of the statute of limitations arbitrarily retract a liberty interest the state had conferred on Stogner?
BY DAN SILVER, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE
It must have been hard enough when Marion Reynolds Stogner saw his two sons accused of child molestation and subsequently sentenced to serve prison time in 1998.
The sequence of events that followed their incarceration was extremely unexpected.
At the age of 70, Stogner, a California native, was arrested for allegedly sexually abusing two children as long ago as 50 years.
Apparently, during the course of the investigation against Stogners sons, police turned up allegations against him, which led to the filing of a criminal complaint.
The complaint, filed in 1998 in Contra Costa County in California against the shocked grandfather charged him with two separate counts of lewd conduct toward children. The first was for his conduct toward Jane Doe I between 1955 and 1964, and the second for his conduct toward Jane Doe II between 1967 and 1973.
The problem for prosecutors was that when Stogner's offenses were allegedly committed, there was a three-year statute of limitations, meaning that charges could only be filed up to three years after the actions allegedly occurred.
The complaint acknowledged that the limitations period for offenses had expired, but alleged the charges could be prosecuted under a recently established law, section 803, subdivision g of California's penal code.
Section 803g, effective January 1, 1994, extended the limitations period for certain sexual offenses committed against minors so long as the prosecution commenced within one year following a report to law enforcement authorities by the victim.
In essence, this law allows for a charge to be brought against a sexual offender for actions committed at any point in the past.
In order to qualify for this special consideration, the crime must have involved "substantial sexual conduct," and the victims allegation must be corroborated by independent evidence.
At the initial hearing, the court ruled that the complaint was unconstitutional in that section 803g constituted an ex post facto law, and therefore did not apply to actions committed before it became part of California law, in 1994.
When the case was appealed to the California Court of Appeals for the 1st Appellate District, however, the decision in the lower court was reversed, and the complaint was replaced by a grand jury indictment against Stogner, filed March 21, 2001.
The reversal was based on the appellate courts holding that section 803g was not unconstitutional as an ex post facto law, because, the court reasoned, the intent of section 803g was to allow sexual molestation to be prosecuted no matter how long ago it occurred.
Stogner objected to the indictment by citing section 805.5 of the same amendment from which section 803g derives. Section 805.5 provided that the law was not applicable to offenses for which prosecution was already time-barred.
The crux of the appellate courts argument is based on the legislative intent of section 803g.
According to the California Court of Appeals opinion, "Section 803g was obviously designed to preclude child molesters from escaping punishment merely because the molestation was revealed after the victim became an adult and after the limitations period had elapsed."
The opinion concluded, in fact, that the entire purpose of section 803g was "to create an exception to the statues of limitations," and that with a statute of limitations, "children become double victims - first victimized by the perpetrator and again by the judicial system."
The California Supreme Court declined review, but on Dec. 2, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case.
The Supreme Court case is being watched for its potential influence on the recent sexual molestation scandals that have rocked the Catholic priesthood in California and elsewhere. As the Stogner case awaited Supreme Court review, suits were pending against more than 100 Roman Catholic priests relating to allegations of sexual molestation, according to the Los Angeles Times.
The scandal has also touched off debate on the importance of having a statute of limitations for sex abuse crimes against minors, especially since the newly revised rules adopted by the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops stipulates that an offense cannot be prosecuted more than 10 years after the victims 18th birthday unless set aside by the Vatican on a case-by-case basis.
"I don't think [it] will come into play that often because of the atmosphere today," said Illinois Appellate Court Judge Ann Burke, who is also on the board of governors of the Catholic Lawyers Guild of Chicago. "Sexual abuse is much more talked about these days than in the past, and I do not think we will have many situations where abuse doesnt come to light until 30 years after the fact."
Many survivors of sexual abuse could not disagree more with that statement.
"Justice Burke's comments are without base and without foundation," said Steve Pona, a media spokesman for the Survivors Network of those Abused by Priests. "The current atmosphere has nothing to do with victims coming forward with abuse. It takes them a long time to report the abuse because it can be a traumatizing experience that takes many years to come to terms with."
On June 26, 2003, on the final day the Court issued opinions for its 2002-03 term, a divided Court reversed. By a vote of 5-4, the Court held that California's law could not be used to revive a previously time-barred prosecution without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.
Justice Stephen Breyer wrote the Court's majority opinion. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the dissent for himself, Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas and Chief Justice William Rehnquist.