Duncan, Supt., Great Meadow v. Walker, Sherman (06/18/2001)

By: Kevin Wack, Medill News Service

Questions presented

Whether a prior federal habeas corpus petition is an ""application for State post-conviction or other collateral review"" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2), which provides that the one-year statute of limitations for federal habeas corpus petitions set forth the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) is tolled during the pendency of such an application.

Brief

Terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the federal building in Oklahoma City helped spur Congress in 1996 to pass the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.

Lawmakers touted two major objectives of the law — preventing future terrorist attacks and limiting the lengthy appeals process available to death-row inmates. But little-noted provisions of the law also placed substantial restrictions on the rights of non-capital defendants to appeal state convictions, a process known in legal circles as filing a ""habeas petition.""

Prior to 1996, a defendant who felt his constitutional trial rights had been violated could file a habeas petition at any time. The new law established a one-year deadline in most cases — and the clock started ticking when the state conviction became final, or, in convictions finalized prior to the laws passage, when President Clinton signed the law on April 24, 1996.

But the law made one important exception. The period during which ""a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review"" was pending would be exempted from the one-year statute of limitations.

For more than four years, courts have struggled to interpret what lawmakers meant by that ambiguous language. Sherman Walkers case has brought their disparate attempts into focus.

In June 1992, Walker pleaded guilty to robbery and was sentenced in Queens County, New York. Almost four years later, Walker filed a federal habeas petition challenging his robbery conviction as unconstitutional due to ineffective legal counsel.

Finding that the petition did not support Walkers claim, a federal judge dismissed the petition three months after it was filed. But Walker was undeterred, and in May 1997 he filed a second federal habeas petition.

Now Walkers argument was more specific — police had violated his right to counsel at the lineup of suspects, and prosecutors had not been prompt in turning over a detectives affidavit explaining why he was included in that lineup.

Once again, though, Walkers petition was denied. This time the court dismissed the claim not on the merits, but because it was filed 26 days after his one-year window of opportunity had closed.

Walker appealed to the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that his first federal habeas petition should be considered an ""application for State post-conviction or other collateral review"" under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. In effect, Walker was claiming the law granted him a three-month extension — a period equal to the time his first habeas petition was pending.

Undertaking a close reading of the disputed statutory language, a unanimous appeals panel agreed.

""It is possible to interpret the word ÔState É to modify both Ôpost-conviction and Ôother collateral,"" Judge Rosemary Pooler wrote in a March 2000 opinion. ""Close analysis of the statute language, however, shows that ÔState modifies only the word Ôpost-conviction, and the phrase Ôother collateral is to be given its naturally broader meaning.""

""ÔState post-conviction review means all collateral review of a conviction provided by a state, and the phrase Ôother collateral review would be meaningless if it did not refer to federal habeas petitions.""

The court added that its interpretation was consistent with the intent of legislators who passed the law to expedite the federal appeals process.

""Congress enacted the limitations period to spur defendants to file their federal habeas petitions more quickly,"" the court wrote. ""Under our reading of the statute, defendants will have an incentive to file their federal petitions right away because this filing will [delay] the one-year statute of limitations.""

At the same time, though, the appeals court noted that its interpretation was in direct conflict with a 1999 decision by the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals. In Jones v. Morton, the 3rd Circuit found that the statutory exception applied only to state appeals.

The office of New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Walker case.

The state noted that about 20,000 federal habeas petitions are filed annually and estimated that the statutory interpretation at issue in the Walker case could affect hundreds of them. Moreover, the state argued in its Supreme Court petition, the 2nd Circuits reading of the law was incorrect.

""The Court of Appeals É erred in concluding that its reading of the statute is more Ônatural than that of the courts with which it disagrees,"" attorneys for the state of New York argued. ""The phrase may not be divided and the words simply uncoupled from each other, as the 2nd Circuit attempts.""

Duncan v. Walker is just one of several cases arising out of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act to reach the U.S. Supreme Court. In the 1996 case, Felker v. Turpin, the Court ruled that the recently-signed law did not violate an inmates constitutional privilege to file a habeas petition.

Most recently, on Nov. 7, 2000, the Court unanimously affirmed another 2nd Circuit decision. The opinion in Artuz v. Bennett clarified the laws requirement that an application for state post-conviction or other collateral relief be ""properly filed.""

On Nov. 13, 2000, the Court accepted the case for review, limited review to the question noted above, and allowed Walker to proceed in forma pauperis.\

On June 18, 2001, the Court, by a vote of 7-2, reversed, holding that a prior federal habeas corpus petition is not an ""application for State post-conviction or other collateral review, "" and therefore does not toll the one-year statute of limitations for federal habeas corpus petitions.