Apprendi, Jr., Charles v. New Jersey (06/26/2000)

By: Jessica Peterson & Liane Jackson, Medill News Service

Questions presented

Is it unconstitutional for a defendant to be sentenced under New Jerseys hate-crime statute to an extended prison term because his or her crime was racially motivated, even though prosecutors only need to prove it was racially motivated by a preponderance of the evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt?

Brief

On Dec. 22, 1994, Charles C. Apprendi, Jr. was arrested for shooting at the home of the only black family in his neighborhood in Vineland, N.J.

He told police he wanted to give the family a message: they were not wanted there because of their skin color.

It was the fourth communiqué of its kind that the family had received. This time one of the neighbors recognized Apprendis gray Chevy truck driving away from the scene.

Apprendi admitted to firing four or five rifle shots into the home and later told authorities that ""he does not know the . . . victims or the family, but because they are black in color he does not want them in the neighborhood.""

He later changed his story, stating that he was under the influence of drugs and alcohol at the time of the shooting, that race had nothing to do with it, and that he had lied to police about it because an officer threatened him and he just wanted to get the questioning over with.

Later Apprendi pleaded guilty to one of the previous shootings, in which a bullet entered a childs room on the third floor of the house. No one was injured in either incident.

Apprendi was indicted on 22 charges, including attempted murder, attempted aggravated assault, harassment, and three weapons counts (of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, of a prohibited weapon and of a destructive device).

Prosecutors reached an agreement with Apprendi in which he pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose—one count for each incident—and one count of possession of a prohibited weapon (an anti-personnel bomb).

The plea agreement stated that Apprendi would serve the sentence for the prohibited weapons count at the same time as the sentence for the two firearms violations. The prosecution reserved the right to seek an extended sentence under New Jerseys hate-crimes statute, and Apprendi reserved the right to contest the constitutionality of the law.

The normal sentence for the weapons possession charge in New Jersey is five to 10 years in prison. New Jerseys hate-crimes law could have extended Apprendis sentence to a maximum of 20 years.

Before sentencing, Apprendis lawyers argued that he had psychological problems and that ""his judgment and impulse control were substantially impaired at the time of the accident.""

In September 1995, the trial judge rejected Apprendis psychological defense and, invoking the enhanced sentencing provision, sentenced him to 12 years in prison with four years of parole ineligibility.

When the statute was instituted in 1990, it stated that a defendants prison term could be lengthened if he or she had committed a crime ""at least in part with ill will, hatred or bias toward the victim.""

In 1994 the New Jersey Supreme Court held in an unrelated case that this statutory language was too vague. The state legislature changed the wording in 1995.

The law now states that a sentence may be extended if ""the defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity.""

Apprendi appealed his sentence, challenging the constitutionality of the hate-crimes statute as unconstitutionally vague, and a denial of his right to due process.

A divided New Jersey appellate court rejected Apprendis vagueness challenge because the wording of the law had been changed prior to his sentencing. The appellate court also rejected Apprendis due process claim, holding that the enhancement, as part of sentencing rather than trial, did not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

One judge dissented, arguing that the defendants purpose in committing the crime is not just a sentencing factor, and therefore should have to be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

On June 24, 1999, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed by a vote of 5-2. The majority held that ""biased purpose is not an element of the weapons possession charge."" It also wrote that ""the statute does not create a separate offense calling for a separate penalty,"" and that ""the Legislature simply took a factor that had always been considered by sentencing courts and dictated the weight to be given that factor.""

The majority stated, ""There is rarely any doubt whether a defendant committed the crime with the purpose of intimidating the victim on the basis of race or ethnicity."" And in Apprendis case, ""There is no real question as to this actors purpose in shooting into his neighbors home.""

Therefore, the court decided, proving that the crime was racially motivated was part of the sentencing and was not subject to the reasonable-doubt standard.

The dissent argued that ""the determination of a defendants mental state required by the statute is so integral to the charged offense that it must be characterized as an element thereof.""

""I think it beyond question that there was . . . Ôserious doubt whether the Constitution permits a defendants sentencing exposure to be increased tenfold on the basis of a fact that is not charged, tried to a jury, and found beyond a reasonable doubt,"" the dissenting judge wrote.

The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on Nov. 29, 1999.

On June 26, 2000 the Court, divided 5-4, held that facts, other than prior convictions, which increase the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be determined by a jury, and not by a judge.

The decision by the sentencing judge to impose two additional years to a 10-year maximum punishment violated Apprendis consitutional rights, wrote Justice John Paul Stevens for the majority. The Court found New Jerseys statute unconstitutional under the due process clause of the 14th Amendment, and the notice and jury trial rights guaranteed by the 5th and 6th Amendments. The ruling rejected ""a state scheme that keeps from the jury facts that Ôexpose[e] [defendants] to greater or additional punishment.""

Judges retain the option to exercise discretion in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute, wrote Stevens, ""[b]ut practice must at least adhere to the basic principles undergirding the requirements of trying to a jury all facts necessary to constitute a statutory offense, and proving those facts beyond reasonable doubt.""

Justice Sandra Day OConnor wrote the dissent on behalf of herself, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice Anthony Kennedy and Justice Steven Breyer.

""The Court appears to hold today, however, that a defendant is entitled to have a jury decide, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, every fact relevant to the determination of sentence under a determinate-sentencing scheme,"" wrote OConnor. ""If this is an accurate description of the constitutional principle underlying the Courts opinion, its decision will have the effect of invalidating significant sentencing reform accomplished at the federal and state levels over the past three decades.""