Ramdass, Bobby v. Angelone, Dir. of VA Dept. of Corrections (06/12/2000)

By: Molly McCarthy, Medill News Service

Questions presented

Whether a jury must be instructed in the death penalty phase of sentencing that if the defendant is not given the death sentence, he will be ineligible for parole if sentenced to life in prison.

Brief

In 1993, a jury in Fairfax County Va. found Bobby Lee Ramdass guilty of murdering Mohammed Kayani, a clerk in the 7-Eleven he held up.

At sentencing, prosecutors sought the death penalty against Ramdass, arguing that he presented ""a continuous serious threat to society"" -- the ""future dangerousness"" predicate for imposition of capital punishment.

In support of their argument, prosecutors presented evidence of Ramdass' criminal history and pattern of recidivism. Specifically, the prosecution detailed how, within three months of his release on mandatory parole after serving four years of a seven-year robbery sentence, Ramdass committed a series of six armed robberies.

The first two robberies were on Aug. 25, 1992. Ramdass robbed a Pizza Hut in Fairfax County, abducted a woman and struck a man. Four days later, he robbed a clerk at an apartment-hotel in Alexandria and hit him in the head with a gun. The next day, he shot and robbed a cab driver. Later that evening, he robbed a clerk at a Domino's Pizza in Arlington. Finally, on Sept. 2, 1992. Ramdass killed Kayani during the sixth robbery in the eight-day spree.

During sentencing deliberations, the jury asked: ""if the Defendant is given life, is there a possibility of parole at some time before his natural death?"" While recognizing that Virginia law did not permit a sentencing jury to be told of a defendant's parole eligibility, Ramdass' attorneys still maintained that ""the (jurors') question itself implies that they have the perception that if they give a life sentence that he will be out in a very short period of time"" and that it was necessary to inform the jury otherwise ""with some kind of language that would balance out the perception.""

Over defense counsel's objection, the trial judge told the jury that it ""should impose such punishment as (they) feel is just under the evidence and instructions of the Court"" and that they ""are not to concern themselves with what may happen afterwards.""

The jury recommended death.

On appeal to the district court, Ramdass was granted a writ of habeas corpus and the state court was ordered to resentence him. The state appellate court found that he'd been denied due process because he wasn't allowed to inform the jury that he was ineligible for parole under Virginia's three-strikes statute, which barred anyone convicted of three felonies from being paroled.

However, the Virginia Supreme Court reaffirmed Ramdass' death sentence, concluding that he was not ineligible for parole. He'd only been sentenced in two of the felony offenses of which he was found guilty. The jurors that convicted him of armed robbery in the Domino's Pizza case had not yet recommended a punishment. Therefore, the state supreme court found he couldn't be sentenced under the three strikes law.

On direct appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, Ramdass argued that his death sentence should be vacated because the trial judge prevented him from telling the jury that he was parole ineligible, a potentially mitigating factor. The Virginia Supreme Court in 1993 rejected the argument, holding that under Virginia precedent, ""a jury should not hear evidence of parole eligibility or ineligibility because it is not a relevant consideration in fixing the appropriate sentence.""

While Ramdass' petition for certiorari was pending before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1994, the Court decided Simmons v. South Carolina, in which it held that when a prosecutor argues future dangerousness to a capitol sentencing jury, a defendant who is parole ineligible has a due process right to respond to that argument by informing the jury of his ineligibility for parole. The Court remanded Ramdass' case to the Virginia Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Simmons.

On remand, Ramdass claimed he was ineligible for parole under Virginia's three-strike statute, so he should have been allowed to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility. The Virginia Supreme Court, however, reaffirmed Ramdass' death sentence, concluding that the holding of Simmons was not implicated because he was not ineligible for parole when the jury was considering his sentence. The hitch was that on his third conviction, judgment had not yet been formally entered against him after the jury verdict.

In 1997, a federal judge granted Ramdass a writ of habeas corpus based on the Simmons claim, ruling that the jury should have been advised that he was ineligible for parole.

A divided 4th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. In accepting the Virginia Supreme Court's state law determination that Ramdass was not, at the time of his sentencing proceedings, legally ineligible for parole, the majority concluded that Simmons was not applicable.

""Even were we persuaded by Ramdass' theory that the practical rather than legal parole ineligibility suffices to trigger Simmons, we would conclude that it was not clearly established,"" the majority wrote.

In dissent, Judge Francis Murnaghan argued that despite the fact that he hadn't been sentenced in the Domino's Pizza case, Ramdass was not legally ineligible for parole and should have been able to make the jury aware of that fact. .

""Splitting hairs when a man's life is at stake is not becoming to a judiciary or a legal system,"" he said.

On Nov. 23, 1999, hours before Ramdass was to be executed at the Greensville Correctional Center in Jarrett, Va., the U.S. Supreme Court granted him a stay of execution. Six weeks later, on Jan. 7, 2000, the Court granted certiorari in the case, allowed Ramdass to proceed in forma pauperis and limited review to the first question on Ramdass' petition.

On June 12, 2000, the Court, divided along ideological lines, affirmed, holding that Ramdass is not entitled to habeas relief.

Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for a plurality of four that the parole ineligibility instruction was not required in this case. The plurality opinion deferred to the Virginia Supreme Courts ""authoritative determination"" that Ramdass was not parole ineligible when the jury considered his sentence. In announcing the Court's decision from the bench, Justice Kennedy underscroed the cold-blooded manner in which the murder was committed.

In concurring, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor agreed that Ramdass is not entitled to habeas relief, relying, though, on the reasoning that the standard of review applicable in federal habeas cases is narrower than that applicable on direct review, and concluding, as the plurality did, that the Court should look to state law to determine the defendants parole status.

""There is an acute unfairness in permitting a state to rely on a recent conviction to establish a defendant's future dangerousness while simultaneously permitting the state to deny that there was such a conviction when the defendant attempts to argue that he is parole ineligible andtherefore not a future danger,"" wrote Justice John Paul Stevens in dissent.He was joined by Justices David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer.