Edwards, Warden v. Carpenter, Robert (04/25/2000)

By: Khalilah L. Liptrot, Medill News Service

Questions presented

Is federal habeas court barred from considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as ""cause"" for procedural default of another habeas claim when the ineffective assistance claim is itself procedurally defaulted?

Brief

On the evening of Oct. 5, 1988, Warren Young found the dead body of his adoptive mother, Thelma Young, a 73-year-old woman, in her Columbus, Ohio home. She had apparently been bludgeoned to death with a blunt object and repeatedly stabbed with a sharp object and a screwdriver. All the cash in her purse and bedroom dresser had been removed.

The next day, Robert W. Carpenter, Warren Young's close friend, telephoned 9-1-1 and stated that he had information concerning the crime. He informed the police officers investigating the crime that while he was attending to his car at a gas station, three men forced him at gunpoint to the rear of his car, and drove the car to Thelma Young's home. At her home, two men took Carpenter's shirt and glasses. According to Carpenter, the three men then forced him to knock on the door, and when Young answered pushed Carpenter inside.

Carpenter asserted that one of the men went with him into Young's bedroom where he was forced to dump the contents of Young's purse on the bed. The man then took the money from Young's purse and forced Carpenter into the bathroom.

While Carpenter was in the bathroom, Young was murdered. Carpenter insisted that after the men left, he exited the bedroom, removed a screwdriver from Young's mouth, and rolled Young onto her back. He retrieved his glasses and shirt that were lying near the body, picked up the screwdriver and left the house.

Although the police initially considered Carpenter a witness, he was eventually arrested. The police retrieved evidence connecting Carpenter to the crime scene, including pieces of Carpenter's clothing with blood from the victim, as well as a screwdriver found in his car. Carpenter has consistently maintained that although he was present during the murder, others committed the crime.

On Oct. 14, 1989, a Franklin County grand jury returned an indictment, charging Carpenter with one count of aggravated murder with a death penalty specification and one count of aggravated robbery. Carpenter initially entered a general plea of not guilty to the charges, but as a result of a plea agreement, waived his right to a jury trial and changed his plea to a conditional guilty plea in which he pleaded guilty while still maintaining his innocence.

During the culpability hearing concerning his guilty plea, held before a three-judge panel, Carpenter asserted his innocence and stated that he pleaded guilty only to avoid the death penalty. The prosecution then recited its statements of facts concerning the charges, which the parties agreed the defense would neither admit nor deny. No witnesses were called during the culpability hearing and no testimony or exhibits was admitted other than the prosecution's statement concerning the crime.

After hearing the prosecution's statement, the three-judge panel accepted Carpenter's plea and found beyond a reasonable doubt that Carpenter had committed the crimes charged in the indictment, including the death penalty specification that Carpenter was the principal offender and committed the murder during an aggravated robbery. The three-judge panel then conducted a mitigation hearing and sentenced Carpenter to a life term of imprisonment with no possibility of parole for thirty years on the aggravated murder count, and to a concurrent term of ten years minimum to twenty-five years maximum on the aggravated robbery count.

On Oct. 9, 1990, Carpenter's attorney appealed his convictions and sentence to the Ohio Court of Appeals, assigning only one error. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and Carpenter did not appeal this decision to the Ohio Supreme Court.

On March 13, 1992, Carpenter applied for post-conviction relief and filed a pro se petition to vacate his convictions and sentence, asserting four errors: (1) ineffective counsel; (2) improper charging of offenses and improper sentences imposed; (3) Alford plea obtained illegally by coercion and threats; and (4) constitutional violations. He also requested production of documents to support his petition. The trial court dismissed the petition on June 18, 1992, finding no substantive grounds for relief.

Carpenter appealed, again pro se, to the Ohio Court of Appeals asserting two errors: (1) the trial court committed reversible error in dismissing his petition to vacate sentence and failing to grant him an evidentiary hearing on his claims; and (2) the trial court erred in not ordering the clerk to convey requested documents to him.

Carpenter then obtained court-appointed counsel and on Sept. 30,1992, filed another brief asserting one assignment of error.

On Dec. 3, 1993, the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed, dismissing Carpenter's petition to vacate, finding that the conclusory statements made in support of his petition were insufficient to state a ground for post-conviction relief. Carpenter, again pro se, appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. The Court dismissed the appeal.

After retaining yet another counsel, Carpenter filed an application to reopen his direct appeal in the Ohio Court of Appeals, alleging that his original appellate counsel was ineffective because he had failed to raise the sufficiency of the evidence claim on direct appeal. This was Carpenter's first opportunity to raise the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because under Ohio law such claims cannot be raised in post-conviction proceedings, but must be raised either in a motion for reconsideration in the court of appeals through an application to reopen direct appeal, or in an appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court.

The Ohio Court of Appeals dismissed Carpenter's application, determining that Carpenter had failed to show good cause for filing his application beyond the 90-day period required. Carpenter subsequently appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, which on Jan. 31, 1996 affirmed the Ohio Court of Appeals' decision in a one-sentence per curiam opinion.

On May 3, 1996, Carpenter filed a habeas corpus petition with the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. He alleged: (1) insufficiency of the evidence to support his plea and subsequent sentence; (2) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; and (3) denial ofa meaningful opportunity to litigate his federal claims in the state courts.

On March 12, 1997, the district court entered judgment for Carpenter on his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim and ordered that a writ of habeas corpus conditionally issue unless the Ohio Court of Appeals reinstated Carpenter's direct appeal from the state conviction within ninety days. The district court did not rule on Carpenter's sufficiency of the evidence and lack of meaningful relief claims, deeming them moot. The State appealed from this judgment and Carpenter cross appealed from the district court's denial of relief on his two other grounds, as well as the district court's choice of remedy.

The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment that the ineffective assistance of Carpenter's appellate counsel constituted cause for the procedural default of his insufficiency of the evidence claim, but remanded the case to the district court for the imposition of a remedy consistent with that opinion. The 6th Circuit's resolution of the cross-appeal in Carpenter's favor rendered moot the State's direct appeal of the district court's grant of a conditional writ of habeas corpus to Carpenter.

Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Nathaniel R. Jones said ""under normal circumstances a plea of guilty precludes the defendant from attacking the sufficiency of the evidence under Ohio law. Ohio law, however, requires that a party who pleads guilty to aggravated murder appear before athree-judge panel which must 'examine the witness, determine whether the accused is guilty of aggravated murderÉ and pronounce sentence accordingly.' Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are therefore expressly permitted on aggravated murder charges.""

The U.S. Supreme Court granted Ohio's petition for certiorari on Nov. 8, 1999. Amici briefs from 25 other states supported its petition.

On April 25, 2000, the Court reversed, holding against Carpenter that inmates who seek federal habeas relief based on the ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate that the poor lawyering rises to a constitutional level, not only that it prejudiced them at trial.

Writing for a 7-2 majority, Justice Antonin Scalia said it is not enough for an inmate to claim that ""the ineffective-assistance claim was presented to the state courts, even though it was not presented in the manner that state law requires.""

In dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer asked for himself and Justice John Paul Stevens whether an inmate should lose his basic claim because he ""runs afoul of state procedural rules governing the presentation to state courts of the 'cause' for his not having followed state procedural rules?""